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INTRODUCTION

Salus Populi Suprema Lex: The Public Welfare is the Highest Law'
On December 23, 2003, the first American case of "Mad Cow"
Disease ("MCD") was discovered in Washington state.2 The economic
impact was immediate and drastic. 3 Contrasted with the economic
consequences of an outbreak, however, the impact was small.4 Because of
its large livestock industry, an outbreak of MCD or other contagious animal
disease, such as Foot and Mouth Disease ("FMD"), could devastate North
Carolina's economy.5 Unconnected to the December discovery, the first
American death potentially linked to MCD was discovered in June 2004.6
Authorities initially believed the twenty-five-year-old Florida woman
contracted the human variant of MCD from eating contaminated beef in
England, twelve years prior to her death.7 The potential catastrophic
impact of an outbreak-in both economic and human terms-necessitates
an aggressive containment plan for North Carolina. The recent increase in
public awareness of contagious animal diseases, due primarily to the MCD
scare, presents an opportunity to consider North Carolina's approach to
preventing an outbreak.
North Carolina's elected officials and citizens were never more aware
of the threat posed by contagious animal diseases than in the spring of
2001. The United Kingdom's economy and livestock industry were reeling
from ruinous FMD and MCD outbreaks.8 North Carolina braced for the
first American, if not North Carolinian, case. 9 In response to the
potentially dire economic consequences of an outbreak and the potentially

1. State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 999, 35 S.E. 459, 459 (1900).
2. Restaurant Shares Rally From Mad Cow Lows, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at C4
[hereinafter RestaurantShares].
3. See, e.g., George Raine, Beef Exports in Limbo; Shipping and Trading Companies Hurt
in Mad Cow Scare, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2004, at BI (describing the impact on the beef
exportation industry). But see George Raine, Beef Sales Up Despite Mad Cow; Wholesalers
Goingfor Seconds of Meat as U.S. PricesFall, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 14, 2004, at BI (discussing the
advantage for domestic consumers and the continuing demand for beef).
4. See infra Part I.C-D.
5. See Bob Williams, N.C. Officials Make Plans in Case Foot-and-Mouth Breaks Out in
State, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 21, 2001, at Al.
6. Woman Dies From Mad Cow Disease, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A12 [hereinafter
Woman Dies].
7. Id.
8. See infra Part I.D.
9. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
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rapid spread of FMD, the North Carolina General Assembly rushed through
Senate Bill 779 ("S.B. 779")."° S.B. 779 was introduced in both houses of
the General Assembly, debated in committees and on the floor of both
houses, passed by both houses, and signed by the Governor in forty-eight
hours. "
S.B. 779 focused on containing a contagious animal disease if one
were discovered, as opposed to preventing the introduction of the disease."
Once a contagious disease was discovered, the bill authorized the state
veterinarian, after receiving the approval of the Governor, to quarantine
large areas of the state, to conduct warrantless searches and seizures of
people and animals, and to destroy potentially infected animals without
notifying the owner.' 3 This authorization greatly expanded the power of
the state veterinarian, an unelected official, and authorized a dramatic
exercise of the state's police power.' 4
This Comment argues that the powers authorized by S.B. 779 are
within the limits of the United State Constitution, that policy considerations
justify the "triggering" provision included in S.B. 779, and that the
"sunset" provision weakens the protection offered by the law. Specifically,
this Comment defends the constitutionality of the three important, and
controversial, police powers included in the 2001 response by introducing
and assessing case law from North Carolina, the federal courts, and other
states. Moreover, it compares other North Carolina statutes that authorize
similar police powers with the codified version of S.B. 779. In addition,
this Comment analyzes the policy rationale supporting the "triggering"
provision of S.B. 779. Before the state veterinarian can exercise any of the
powers allowed under S.B. 779, the Governor must agree that an
"imminent threat" exists.' 5 This Comment defends the decision to require
the Governor's approval. Finally, it considers the "sunset provision" of
S.B. 779. The state veterinarian's powers, under the original legislation,
expired in 2003.16 The day before they expired, the Governor signed a bill
extending the authority for two more years.' 7 This Comment argues that
the sunset provision was an unnecessary and potentially harmful addition to
10. See Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106).
11. See infra Part I.A for a summary of the legislative history.
12. See Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14.

13. Id.
14. The state veterinarian is appointed by the Agriculture Commissioner.

See Williams,

infra note 79 (noting the appointment of Dr. David Marshall as state veterinarian).
15.
sections
16.
17.

Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, 2001 N.C. Sess. Law 14 (codified as amended in scattered
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106).
Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, § 11, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 21.
Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 6, § 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3 (amending S.B. 779 to

extend the sunset provision).
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the legislation that weakens the protection offered by the other sections.
I. BACKGROUND: FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE AND "MAD Cow" DISEASE

Understanding both the nature of FMD and MCD and the potential
economic impact of an outbreak is critical to understanding the threat posed
by these diseases. Characteristics of both diseases make them difficult to
contain and, in the case of MCD, even difficult to detect. Evidence from
the 2001 United Kingdom FMD outbreak and federal estimates regarding
the destructive potential of an American MCD outbreak demonstrate that
FMD and MCD both pose a significant threat to the economic well-being
of North Carolina.
Foot and Mouth Disease

A.

The potential for a Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak is a serious
threat to North Carolina's livestock industry. The disease is found in
cloven-hoofed ("two-toed") animals, such as cows, pigs, and deer.' 8 FMD
does not pose a physical threat to humans.' 9 The disease causes animals to
develop high fevers, stop eating, produce less milk, and often prevents
them from walking without pain.2" Animals do not typically die from
FMD, but generally experience great pain.2
FMD is highly communicable and can spread rapidly if not
contained.22 The disease has an incubation period23 of two to fourteen days
and can affect susceptible animals at any age.24 While the presence of

18.

N.C. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., COMPARISON OF FOOT AND MOUTH

DISEASE (FMD) AND BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE), at http://www.ncagr.com/

vet/FMDvsBSE.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) [hereinafter N.C. CHART] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). There are at least seven types of FMD and more than sixty subtypes. PL
107-9

FED.

INTER-AGENCY

WORKING

GROUP,

ANIMAL

PREVENTION, AND CONTROL ACT OF 2001 (PL 107-9):

DISEASE

RISK

ASSESSMENT,

FINAL REPORT 3 (2003), at

(last visited Nov. 29, 2004)
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pubs/PL107-9_l-03.pdf
[hereinafter WORKING GROUP] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
19. N.C. CHART, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The "incubation period" is the time period between the introduction of the disease and
the onset of the disease/symptoms. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UPDATE 49-SARS
CASE FATALITY RATIO, INCUBATION PERIOD (May 7, 2003), at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/
archive/2003_05_07a/en/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (providing general lay definition of
"incubation period") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See LITERATURE REPORTS
OF

INCUBATION

PERIOD

FOR

FOOT

AND

MOUTH

DISEASE,

at

http://212.187.155.84/pass-06june/LisLWPMod_Cont/FMD/DiseaseFMDlnfection/fmdincub.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (providing more information on the incubation period for FMD)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
24. N.C. CHART, supra note 18.
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FMD must be confirmed through laboratory testing,25 the blisters associated
with FMD are the most well-recognized signs of the disease.2 6 The virus
can spread through the exhaled air, milk, semen, and blood of the infected
animals, among other means. 7 Transmission generally occurs through
direct contact.28 FMD "has a remarkable capacity for remaining viable in
carcasses, in animal byproducts, in water, in such materials as straw and
bedding, and even in pastures. '29 Humans can also transmit the virus
between farms and animals." Once an outbreak is discovered, eradication
normally requires euthanasia.3"
B.

"Mad Cow" Disease

An outbreak of "Mad Cow" Disease is equally threatening to animals
and also dangerous to humans. MCD causes a "progressive degeneration
of the central nervous system in cattle. 32 The disease is invariably fatal.33
Originally discovered in 1986, and subsequently documented in at least
180,000 cases34 and nineteen countries, the cause or causes of the disease
remain unknown.35 MCD has a lengthy incubation period of two to eight
years,36 and its external signs are not as obvious as those associated with
FMD.37 Once the clinical signs appear, however, death generally occurs

25. Id.
26. WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 3. The blisters traditionally appear "in the mouth,
on the tongue and lips, on the teats, or between the toes" of the infected animals. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. N.C. CHART, supra note 18.
31. Id.
32. WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 35. The technical name for Mad Cow is Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy. Id.
33. Id.
34. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., BOVINE
OVERVIEW (last modified June 30, 2003), at
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE):
(last visited Nov. 29, 2004)
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse-overview.html
[hereinafter OVERVIEW] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
35. WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 35. The working group paper predates the
discovery in America. Id. at 1-2. The North Carolina Department of Agriculture notes the
existence in at least thirty-one countries. N.C. CHART, supra note 18. But see Sandra Blakeslee,
Study Lends Support to Mad Cow Theory: Scientists Report Creating a Protein That Spread
Disease in Mice, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2004, at A13 (summarizing a recent scientific discovery
that may shed light on the cause of MCD).
36. One leading scientist has suggested the incubation period may be longer. See Joseph
Mercola, Mad Cow Disease May Have 30 Year Incubation Period (Mar. 22, 2001), at
http://www.mercola.com/beef/incubation.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
37. N.C. CHART, supra note 18. The typical external signs associated with MCD are
"changes in behavior, incoordination, abnormal posture, falling down, [and] difficulty rising." Id.
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within six months.38 The brain tissue of potentially infected cattle must be
tested in order to ensure an accurate diagnosis, requiring slaughter of the
affected cow.39 Currently, there is no treatment and no vaccine.4"
MCD spreads through the feeding process. For decades, some cattle
feed has contained proteins rendered from the carcasses of other cattle or
sheep.4' When a cow consumes feed containing meat and bone meal from
42 There is
an infected carcass, the consuming cow can contract the disease.
43
animals.
live
among
no evidence that MCD can be transmitted
Contrary to FMD, MCD threatens human health. Epidemiological and
laboratory evidence has demonstrated a link between MCD and a disease in
humans called "variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease" ("vCJD"). 4 Like MCD,
vCJD is an invariably fatal brain disease and has an incubation period
measured in years. 4' The human version of the disease is acquired by
consuming beef from an infected cow. 46 The precise risk associated with
eating beef in countries where MCD has been discovered is difficult to
determine because of the long incubation period. 47 However, the risk of
acquiring vCJD is very small-estimated at one case per ten billion
servings in the United Kingdom. 48 Nevertheless, a recent American death
shows the continued reality of the threat.49
C. PotentialEconomic Impact of an FMD or MCD Outbreak in North
Carolina
The potential, however small, of a vCJD outbreak in North Carolina is
a serious threat to human health. Yet, the greater threat posed by MCD and
FMD is economic. An outbreak of FMD or MCD could potentially
devastate the state's pork or beef industries.5 1
Then-Agriculture
38. OVERVIEW, supra note 34.
39. N.C. CHART, supra note 18. A test that would not require slaughter is being developed.
WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 35.
40. WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 35.
41. Id.
42. See N.C. CHART, supra note 18 (discussing transmission of the disease).
43. Id.
44. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY AND
VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE, at http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/madcow.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2004) [hereinafter CDC] (citing "strong evidence" indicating a causal
relationship between MCD and vCJD) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); WORKING
GROUP, supra note 18, at 36.
45. CDC, supra note 44.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Woman Dies, supra note 6.
50. See Williams, supra note 5 (noting the potential impact on the pork industry). A
simulated FMD outbreak conducted by the N.C. State Emergency Management Office supported
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Commissioner Meg Scott Phipps predicted in 2001 that an FMD outbreak
51
could cripple North Carolina's entire economy.
North Carolina's legislative response to FMD and MCD is intended to
limit the economic impact of an infected animal by preventing the spread
of both diseases-in short, to keep one case from sparking an outbreak. In
order to assess the value and effectiveness of the response, this Comment
will therefore consider the economic consequences of an outbreak rather
than a single case.
The last case of FMD in the United States was discovered in 1929.52
The first U.S. case of MCD was discovered in December 2003. 53 There is
no evidence of an outbreak associated with the latter case. Accordingly,
any calculation of economic harm from FMD or MCD must rely on theory
rather than experience. The economic impact of an FMD outbreak in North
Carolina can be estimated and described by considering the FMD outbreak
in the United Kingdom in 2001 and the January 2003 federal estimates of
the impact of an American FMD outbreak. The federal estimates also
demonstrate the potential impact of an MCD epidemic.
D.

2001 FMD Outbreak in the United Kingdom

On February 20, 2001, the first case of FMD was confirmed in the
United Kingdom.54 Within a month the single case had turned into an
epidemic and the government struggled to limit the damage: "Fed by the
carcasses of thousands of pigs, sheep and cows, funeral pyres pumped
black smoke into the sky as the country battled the latest scourge to its
agriculture industry."'"5 The government had slaughtered nearly three
million animals by May.56 The farming and tourism sectors of the
economy bore the brunt of the damage. 7 Some estimates regarding the
long-term damage to the farming sector reached over five billion dollars. 8

that assessment. The simulation began on a farm in central Duplin County, the heart of North
Carolina hog country. Id. The six-mile radius would include 440,000 hogs, all of which might
have to be slaughtered. Id. If the radius was expanded to fifteen miles, the number increases to
1.9 million hogs and at twenty miles, 2.8 million. Id.

51. Id.
52. See WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 4.
53. See RestaurantShares, supra note 2 (discussing the recovery of share prices in fast food
and steakhouse restaurants after the MCD discovery).
54. The Costs and Cures, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001, at 63.

55. Stryker McGuire, Death of the British Farmer, NEWSWEEK (European ed.), Mar. 12,
2001, at 16.
56. After Foot and Mouth, ECONOMIST, May 5,2001, at 49.

57. See id. (documenting the damage done to the economy by May of 2001 and discussing
the expected long-term impact).
58. Id.
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The tourism industry was also devastated by the FMD outbreak.5 9
One estimate puts the loss for 2001 at between three and four billion
dollars.60 An official with the British Tourist Authority estimated in May
2001 that it would take three years for the industry to return to full
strength.61 In addition to farming and tourism losses, hunting, fishing, and
sporting events were canceled; and parks, forests, and zoos were closed.62
The fear of contracting and spreading FMD was so great that the Irish
Prime Minister canceled Dublin's St. Patrick's Day parade.63
E.

FederalEstimates

The federal government estimates an FMD outbreak would devastate
the American economy as it did the United Kingdom's economy.' Unless
detected and eradicated immediately, the disease could spread to all sectors
of the country simply through routine livestock movement.65 Some experts
estimate as the worst-case scenario that the disease could affect seventy
percent of U.S. livestock.66 No matter what size, an outbreak would require
the slaughtering of all infected animals and many uninfected animals as a
preventive measure. An outbreak could also require that some animals be
depopulated to contain the spread and would, at a minimum, require the
cleaning, disinfecting, and potential quarantine of affected farms.67 Federal
estimates place likely productivity losses in the livestock industries at ten to
twenty percent. 68 Given the slim profit margins of the American livestock
industry, the losses associated with the slaughters and the income lost over
the cleansing period would force some commercial livestock producers to
close.69

The United States traditionally exports six to ten billion dollars worth
of livestock per year, accounting for roughly ten percent of producer
income at the farm level.70 An FMD outbreak would likely trigger trade
restrictions on U.S. beef and pork products, ending exportation in the short-

59. See Alan Cowell, Foot-and-Mouth Damages English Tourism, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2001, at A4 (discussing the impact on rural tourism and related industries).
60. See After Foot and Mouth, supra note 56 (estimating the loss at 2.5 million Pounds).
61. Id.
62. See Sarah Lyall, Foot-and-Mouth Disease Intrudes, Putting British Farmers in Dread,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at Al.
63. Id.
64. See WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 9-12.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id. at 10-11.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 11.
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term.7 1 The trade restrictions would lead to an increase in the supply of
livestock products on the domestic market, causing those products to
decrease in price, and further minimizing the chance small farmers could
financially survive an outbreak.72
The federal estimates regarding an MCD outbreak predict7 3similar
results. Beef and dairy product sales would likely decline severely.
Producers forced to destroy their livestock would face additional
long-term costs associated with rebuilding. Even though U.S.
farmers could be compensated for the market value of animals, ...
producers would lose the time and funds they had spent in building
There would be reduced income while
their breeding stock.
rebuilding the stock. Prices may be higher for purchasing additional
stock, while the market price for animal products could decline.74
Exportation of cattle and beef products would significantly decrease.75 The
long incubation period of MCD makes the speed and the direction of the
spread difficult to monitor. Consequently, it is expected that trading
partners would institute long-term bans on American beef products as
opposed to the shorter-term bans caused by an FMD outbreak.76
11. THE 2001 RESPONSE AND THE 2003 DECISION TO RENEW
A.

North Carolina'sLegislative Response, 2001: Procedure

Sparked by the threat posed by both FMD and MCD and the discovery
of five hogs in Martin and Sampson counties suspected of being infected
with FMD,77 the North Carolina General Assembly hurriedly responded in
April 2001.78 In general terms, the legislation increased the quarantine
power of the state veterinarian, authorized the veterinarian to conduct
warrantless searches and seizures, and authorized the destruction of

71. See id. (discussing expected export restrictions); see also Raine, supra note 3 (describing
the impact on the beef exportation industry).
72. See WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 11.
73. Id. at 39.
74. Id. Further exacerbating the decline in beef product prices would be the potential
increased availability of safe products on the domestic market due to trade barriers preventing
export. Id. In addition, as the public preference shifted to other meat products the demand for,
and prices of, beef products would likely decline. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Bob Williams, Hogs Test Negative in State's Second Disease Scare, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 1, 2001,. at BI.
78. See Kerra Bolton Fisher, State Moves On Foot-and-Mouth Bill; Legislators Hope Law
Would Prevent Spread of Disease,ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at B I.
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potentially infected animals without notice.79
Media reports noted the speed with which the General Assembly
acted.8" The bill, S.B. 779, was introduced in the Senate on April 2, 2001
with the short title: "Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreak."8 1
After referral to the Agriculture Committee on April 2,82 the Committee
considered the bill, amended it twice, and gave it a favorable report-all on
the following day, April 3.83 Senator Charles Albertson (D-Duplin,
Harnett, Sampson) offered the first amendment, which would authorize the
state veterinarian to destroy as well as seize potentially infected animals
without notifying the owner.'
Senator Hamilton Horton (R-Forsyth)
offered the second amendment, which added a two-year sunset provision to
the legislation." Later that day the Senate received the substitute version
from the committee, placed the new version on that day's calendar,86 and
passed the bill.87 S.B. 779 was then sent to the House for consideration.88
The House, meanwhile, was considering a companion bill, H.B. 965.89
Working somewhat out of order, 9° a draft version of the House bill was
considered on April 3 at 10:05 a.m. in the House Agriculture Committee.9
79. See Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106); see also Fisher, supra note 78 (describing the
legislation); Bob Williams, All Eyes on Most Powerful Vet in State History, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 22, 2001, at BI (describing the legislation).
80. Lynn Bonner, Legislature Still Faces Toughest Issues of All, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 30, 2001, at AI ("[L]egislators quickly approved sweeping new powers for
the state veterinarian."); Fisher, supra note 78 (describing the General Assembly as moving like
"greased lightning"); Williams, supra note 77 (noting the brief debate before passage).
81. S. 779, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001) (edition 1),at http://www.ncleg.net/
htm1200l/bills/AllVersions/Senate/S779vl.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
82. 2001 N.C. Senate Journal 255. The committee held an earlier hearing on FMD on
March 20. Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on Foot and Mouth
Disease Before the Senate Agriculture/Environment/NaturalResources Committee, 2001 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001) (Mar. 20, 2001 minutes). At that hearing, then-Agriculture
Commissioner Meg Scott Phipps and State Veterinarian Dr. David Marshall testified regarding
the disease and its spread. Id. Dr. Marshall explained the necessity of slaughtering animals to
prevent an outbreak. Id.
83. Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on S.B. 779 Before the
Senate Agriculture/Environment/NaturalResources Committee, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2001) (Apr. 3, 2001 minutes).
84. Id. (amendment proposed by Sen. Albertson).
85. Id. (amendment proposed by Sen. Horton). See infra note 153 and accompanying text
(defining "sunset provision").
86. 2001 N.C. Senate Journal 265.
87. Id. at 266.
88. Id.
89. See 2001 N.C. House Journal 425. A "companion bill" is a second version of a bill
introduced in the opposite house. The bills are substantially, but not always absolutely, similar.
90. The Committee considered the draft version of the legislation before S.B. 779 was
officially introduced in the House.
91. Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on Draft H.B. 965 Before
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At that time, the state veterinarian testified before the committee.9 2 He
discussed the power to destroy potentially infected animals and the need for
greater quarantine power.93 Some members raised the possibility that the
Governor should be included in the emergency decisionmaking process and
discussed who might be allowed to speak for the Governor if he were
unavailable during an outbreak.9 4 The committee chairman adjourned the
meeting and announced that the committee would meet again during the
House session that afternoon." The House bill was officially introduced at
3:00 p.m.96 and referred to the Agriculture Committee.97 At 3:30 p.m., the
House recessed98 and the Agriculture Committee met to officially consider
H.B. 965. 99 At 3:35 p.m., the Committee meeting was called to order."° A
Proposed Committee Substitute version of the bill was introduced and
passed unanimously. 10 1 The new version added a sunset provision identical
to the one added to S.B. 779 in the Senate Agriculture Committee.0 2
Committee members raised concerns regarding the warrantless search and
seizure power, but, in the interest of speedy passage, the committee decided
that no amendments would be accepted.'0 3 The House reconvened at 4:10
p.m."° and adopted the committee substitute version, amended it, and
passed H.B. 965."05 The amendment adopted on the House floor required
the state veterinarian to receive "approval from the Governor" before he
exercised the powers authorized in the bill.0 6 H.B. 965 was then sent to the
Senate."7 The House had introduced, sent to committee, considered,
amended, and passed its version of the bill in one day. The next day, April
the House Agriculture Committee, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001) (Apr. 3, 2001
minutes).
92. Id.
93. Id. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (describing the increase in quarantine
power).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See 2001 N.C. House Journal 416 (documenting 3:00 p.m. as the beginning of the
session).
97. See id. at 425.
98. Id. at 426.
99. Control Foot & MouthAnimal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on S.B. 779 Before the
Senate Agriculture/Environment/Natural Resources Committee, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2001) (Apr. 3, 2001 minutes).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. (noting that the bill was to return to the floor at 4: 10).
105. 2001 N.C. House Journal 427.
106. H.R. 965, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001) (version 3), at http://www.ncleg.
net/htm12001/bills/AllVersions/House/H965v3.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
107. 2001 N.C. House Journal 427.
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4, the Senate received H.B. 965. °8 The Senate referred the House version
to the Agriculture
Committee where H.B. 965 died in favor of the Senate
version. "°
Also on April 3, one day after S.B. 779 had been introduced in, and
the same day it had been passed by, the Senate, the House received the
Senate version of the bill and referred S.B. 779 to its Agriculture
Committee. " ° At noon on April 4, the House Agriculture Committee met
to "hear and expedite passage" of a House committee substitute version of
S.B. 779.111 The substitute version included two key differences from H.B.
965 and the original version of S.B. 779: it removed the sunset provision
that had been added to both the original House and Senate versions and
changed the authorizing language from "with the approval of' the
Governor to "in consultation with" the Governor or the Governor's
designee.112 Both changes were discussed in the committee, and the change
to the authorizing language was adopted." 3 After House committee
members expressed concerns over the inability to pass the legislation
without a sunset provision, the committee substitute version was amended
to include a four-year sunset provision.'14 The House convened later that
day and adopted the substitute version offered by the House Agriculture
Committee." 5 S.B. 779 was amended twice on the House floor. 116 The
first amendment changed the authorizing language back to "with the
approval of the Governor" rather than "in consultation with the Governor
or the Governor's designee.""' 7 The second amendment changed the sunset
provision back to a two-year sunset." 8 The House then sent S.B. 779 back
to the Senate." 9 The Senate immediately considered and approved both the
House committee substitute version and the two amendments and sent the

108. 2001 N.C. Senate Journal 278.
109. House Bill 965 (=S779), at http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?
Session=2001&BillID=h+965 (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (detailing the legislative history of
H.B. 965) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
110. 2001 N.C. House Journal 428.
111. Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on Proposed House
Committee Substitute to S.B. 779 Before the House Agriculture Committee, 2001 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001) (Apr. 4, 2001 minutes).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 2001 N.C. House Journal 431 (indicating the House Agriculture Committee favorably
reported and calendared the House committee substitute version).
116. Id. at 438.
117. North Carolina General Assembly Amendment, S. 779, Apr. 4, 2001 (amendment
proposed by Rep. Allred) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
118. North Carolina General Assembly Amendment, S. 779, Apr. 4, 2001 (amendment
proposed by Rep. Blust) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
119. 2001 N.C. House Journal 438.
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bill to the Governor. 120 The Governor signed the bill at 6:44 p.m. that same
day, April 4--only two days after its original introduction in the Senate. 2 '
Given the rate at which legislation is normally considered by the North
Carolina General Assembly, S.B. 779's forty-eight-hour sprint from
introduction on the Senate floor to signature by the Governor is nothing
22
short of remarkable. 1
B.

North Carolina'sLegislative Response, 2001: Substance

The rapid passage and near-unanimous vote counts mask important
and controversial elements of S.B. 779. Five notable aspects of the
legislation were highlighted by public disagreement, committee debate,
amendments, and discrepancies between the House and Senate versions.
S.B. 779 dramatically increased the quarantine power of the state
veterinarian, authorized the state veterinarian to conduct warrantless
searches and seizures of vehicles and individuals, and allowed for the
23
slaughter of potentially infected animals without notifying the owner.
However, certain conditions must be met before the state veterinarian is
allowed to exercise any of the newly granted authority. The powers are
triggered only by an "imminent threat" of "serious" economic
consequence, and the veterinarian must consult with the Agriculture
24
Commissioner and receive approval from the Governor before acting.
The legislation also included a two-year "sunset provision."125
The five important aspects of S.B. 779 break down into three new
powers for the state veterinarian, the triggering provision, and the sunset
provision. The first of the controversial new powers granted to the
veterinarian is the warrantless search and seizure power. 126 She is
authorized to conduct warrantless searches of any person or car suspected
of carrying a contagious animal disease. 127 This new power was not
universally endorsed in 2001. Senator Hamilton Horton (R-Forsyth)
described the warrantless search and seizure power as equivalent to "war
120. 2001 N.C. Senate Journal 283.
121. Senate Bill 779 (=H965), at http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BilILookUp/BilLookUp.pl?
Session=2001&Bill1D=s779 (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). See Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, § 11, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 21 (showing the time
of the Governor's signature).
122. See Fisher, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
123. See Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14 (codified in scattered sections
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106).
124. Id.
125. Id. See infra note 153 and accompanying text (defining "sunset provision").
126. See Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 14-15 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-399.4-399.5).
127. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 1, § 106-399.5, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 15 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106.399.5).
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powers": "We're authorizing, through this bill, the state veterinarian to
take on powers we would never give to a police officer-a warrantless
search and destroying valuable process at the owner's expense. Due
'
A Greensboro News & Record editorial,
process is out of the window."128
arguing the General Assembly "[went] off half-cocked" and calling the
legislation "melodramatic" and "unnecessary," claimed: "[I]n a minor fit
of hysteria this week, both houses of the General Assembly rushed through
ill-conceived and dangerous bills authorizing warrantless seizures."' 9 In
contrast, supporters referred to the power as part of a "necessary
preemptive strike" against the spread of contagious animal diseases.13 °
This Comment will defend the authorization of the warrantless search and
constitutional limits and consistent with
seizure power as being within
31
statutes.1
Carolina
North
other
Second, S.B. 779 expanded the state veterinarian's quarantine power.
The state veterinarian's quarantine power was previously limited to the
ability to quarantine an animal or a farm. 132 The 2001 legislation
33
empowered the state veterinarian to quarantine "areas within the State"' a much larger geographic area. Animal movement within the quarantine
zone is prohibited unless the state veterinarian grants authorization. 3 4 The
notice provisions demonstrate the difference, as contemplated by the
General Assembly, between the pre-2001 power 35 and the power
authorized by S.B. 779. Under the old provision, the only public notice
required was the "posting or placarding with a suitable quarantine sign the
entrance to any part of the premises on which the animal is held."' 36 Under
S.B. 779, when exercising the new quarantine power, the state veterinarian
must notify through writing the "news media, farm organizations,
agriculture agencies, and other entities reasonably calculated to give notice
of the quarantine to affected animal owners, to the owners or operators of
affected premises, and to the public."' 37 The different notice requirements
128. Fisher, supra note 78.
129. No WarrantlessSeizures, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Apr. 6, 2001, at AI0.
130. General Assembly Goes to War Against Disease, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Apr. 9,
2001, at A6.
131. See infra Part III.
132. See N.C. GEN. STAT 106-401* (2003) (authorizing the quarantine of animals infected
with or exposed to a contagious disease and establishing a notice method based on the premises
on which those animals are located). This Comment uses "*" to designate the pre-2001 version
of the legislation, which is still valid although not in effect until S.B. 779's provisions sunset. See
infra note 231 (explaining the use of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401 *).
133. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 2, § 106-401(b), 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 16 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401(b)).
134. Id.
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401 *(2003).
136. Id.
137. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 2, § 106-401(b), 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 17 (codified
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signal the broad quarantine power contemplated by the phrase "areas
within the State" by emphasizing the need to notify a greater number of
interested parties and the public in general. The nature of the language
chosen-"areas within the State"-and the derivative ability to quarantine
large sections of the state are the roots of the controversy. This Comment
will demonstrate the constitutionality of the expanded quarantine power.138
The third important power was the authority to slaughter potentially
infected animals without giving notice to the owner. The veterinarian was
only authorized to seize the animal without notice in the original version of
the bill.139 The power to destroy the animal was added as an amendment.14°
This Comment will show that the Constitution does not require notice prior
to slaughter.'4 1 Moreover, this Comment will illustrate that, although
controversial, the authority to destroy is not unique, as other North Carolina
statutes include similar provisions.14 2
The "triggering" provision of the legislation has three elements. The
first element concerns the situation in the state. 143 To satisfy the first
element, the state veterinarian must determine that the animal disease poses
"an imminent threat."'" This condition is easily met by one case of FMD
or MCD given the nature of the contagious diseases and the projected
economic impact in North Carolina.145 The state veterinarian is also
required to consult the Agriculture Commissioner. 146 Consultation is left
undefined by the statute, 147 and the satisfaction of this condition is entirely
in the state veterinarian's control; 48 hence, as with the first element, this
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401(b)).
138. See infra Part IV.
139. S. 779, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001) (edition 1), at http://www.ncleg.net/
html2001/bills/AllVersions/Senate/S779vl.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) ("In the event the
owner ... cannot be notified, the State Veterinarian ... may seize the animal") (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
140. Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on S.B. 779 Before the
Senate Agriculture/Environment/NaturalResources Committee, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2001) (amendment proposed by Sen. Albertson).
141. See infra Part V.
142. See infra Part V.B.
143. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 1, § 106-399.4(a), N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 14 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.4).
144. Id. The statute defines the condition as "an imminent threat within the State of a
contagious animal disease that has the potential for very serious and rapid spread, is of serious
socioeconomic and public health consequence, or is of major importance in the international trade
of animals and animal products ... ." Id.
145. See supra Part I.C. (discussing the impact of an outbreak of FMD or MCD on North
Carolina).
146. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 3, § 106-402.1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 17-18
(codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-402.1).
147. See id. (failing to note a specific definition of "consultation").
148. This Comment presumes that the Commissioner will be available during the crisis or will
leave clear directions regarding how to contact her. Furthermore, this Comment draws a
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condition is easily met. The third element is more controversial.' 49 The bill
was amended on the House floor to require the approval of the Governor as
opposed to requiring only consultation with the Governor. 5" The vote was
closer on the amendment than on the bill as a whole.' 5' This Comment will
defend the decision to require approval rather than consultation by
exploring statutes that require the Governor's approval and assessing the
policy implications of the choice.152
The final controversial aspect of the legislation was the sunset
provision. A sunset provision sets a date after which the laws or powers
that are the subject of the legislation are no longer in force.153 As noted
above, the sunset provision was added in and taken out of the legislation
numerous times. 154 In its final form, S.B. 779 expired by its own terms on
April 1, 2003, roughly two years after it was signed.'55 This Comment
assesses the benefits and costs of the two-year expiration date and
concludes that the sunset provision, at the least, was an unnecessary
addition to the legislation, and at worst, weakens the protection offered by
S.B. 779.156

distinction between "consultation," which by its vague nature is virtually no limit on the
decisionmaking process and "approval," which requires the state veterinarian to wait on the
independent action of the Governor prior to implementation.
149. The first time the amendment was offered on H.B. 965, the House voted 110-2 to add
the "approval" language. North Carolina General Assembly Amendment, H.R. 965, Apr. 3, 2001
(amendment proposed by Rep. Allred) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); North
Carolina House of Representatives Roll Call, H.R. 965, Seq. no. 131, Apr. 3, 2001 (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). However, the second time the amendment was offered on S.B.
779, the House voted 85-29 to substitute "approval" for "consultation." North Carolina General
Assembly Amendment, S. 779, Committee Substitute, Apr. 4, 2001 (amendment proposed by
Rep. Allred) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); North Carolina House of
Representatives Roll Call, S. 779, Seq. no. 134, Apr. 4, 2001 (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). Twenty-seven representatives would rather require consultation than approval but
find approval better than no requirement.
150. North Carolina General Assembly Amendment, S. 779, Committee Substitute, Apr. 4,
2001 (amendment proposed by Rep. Allred) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); North
Carolina House of Representatives Roll Call, S.779, Seq. no. 134, Apr. 4, 2001 (approving the
amendment proposed by Rep. Allred) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
151. Compare North Carolina House of Representatives Roll Call, S.779, Seq. no. 134, Apr.
4, 2001 (approving the amendment proposed by Rep. Allred by a vote of eighty-five to twentynine) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), with North Carolina House of
Representatives Roll Call, S.779, Seq. no. 136, Apr. 4, 2001 (passing S.779 by a vote of 110 to
four) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
152. See infra Part VI.
153. See Poland v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 276 B.R. 660, 666 n.3. (D. Kan. 2001)
(memorandum decision) ("That law contained a 'sunset provision' under which the amendment
was slated to expire on Oct. 1, 1996."); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 50
F. Supp. 2d 741, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
154. See supra Part Il.A (discussing legislative history).
155. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, § 11, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws, 14, 21.
156. See infra Part VII.
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North Carolina'sExecutive Response, 2001
The state's reaction to the five hogs suspected of infection in 2001157
and the state emergency management plan demonstrate how the police
powers authorized in S.B. 779 might look when implemented. In response
to the five suspected cases of FMD in North Carolina, both of which
occurred before S.B. 779 was introduced, the state veterinarian quickly
applied the limited quarantine power authorized in the pre-2001 statute.'5 8
The packing plant and the buying station at which the potentially infected
hogs were discovered were both immediately quarantined. 5 9 The hogs
were sent for testing and shipping records were used to determine other
potentially infected hogs. 6 ° In both cases, the test for FMD did not show
the presence of the disease. 6 '
The state emergency operation manual describes the procedure for
handling a positive test result under the newly granted powers. A 2001
News & Observerarticle summarized the planned response:
C.

Were there a confirmed case of foot-and-mouth disease in Eastern
North Carolina, the state would immediately seal off a perimeter,
quarantining the area for six miles in all directions. Roads leading
into the area would be blocked by the National Guard, state troopers
or other law enforcement personnel. If the area were near an
interstate highway, traffic would be detoured around the quarantine
zone.
Anyone allowed into the quarantined area would have to first pass
through a decontamination checkpoint. Vehicles would have to
drive through a decontamination unit that would blast all surfaces
with a mix of water and disinfectant, anything from household
bleach to citric acid. People would have to change their clothes or
don protective decontamination suits.
Teams of veterinarians in special suits and gas masks would rush to
the infected farm to kill all the animals. Each would use a captivebolt gun, a device specially designed to humanely kill large numbers
of livestock, especially pigs. Disposal teams would move in after
that, covering dead animals with plastic until they could be buried.
The teams would then move on to surrounding farms. Animals
found to be infected or suspected of having the disease would also be
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See Williams, supra note 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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killed and their carcasses buried.
At the same time, agricultural officials would be trying to track
down any animals that might have come in contact with the infected
livestock, poring through shipping and sales records. Those animals
would also have to be tracked down, tested, and killed if necessary.
Command posts would be set up, along with mobile kitchens and
barracks within the quarantined zone for workers. Anyone exiting
the zone would have to be decontaminated.
Additional personnel from USDA and other federal agencies would
arrive fairly quickly. Military personnel might be called in,as they
were during Hurricane Floyd.
And all that assumes the disease could be detected quickly and
confined to a single site-an assumption most experts believe is
unlikely. 6
Given that the statutory provisions have remained unchanged, the
current response plan is likely similar.
D. North Carolina'sDecision to Renew, 2003
On March 31, 2003, the day before the 2001 legislation expired,
Governor Easley signed S.B. 307, extending the 2001 authorization until
October 2005.63 The original version of S.B. 307 removed the sunset
provision. 64 However, the Senate Agriculture Committee's substitute
version, instead of removing the sunset date, extended it to October 1,
2005;165 the full Senate accepted the committee's substitute.'6 6 The 2003
renewal leaves the state veterinarian's substantive powers as passed in
2001 currently in force.
III. THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE POWER

As proposed and enacted in S.B. 779 and extended in S.B. 307, North
162. Williams, supra note 5.
163. Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 6, §§ 1-2, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3-4 (ratifying S.B. 307 to
extend the sunset date included in the enacted version of S.B. 779).
164. S. 307, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2003) (edition 1),at http://www.ncleg.net/
html2003/bills/AllVersions/Senate/S307vl.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
165. S. 307, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2003) (edition 2), at http://www.ncleg.net/
html2003/bills/AllVersions/Senate/S307v2.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); see also Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, § 11, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws
14, 21 (ratifying S.B. 779, including the original Apr. 1, 2003 sunset date).
166. Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 6, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3-4.
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Carolina General Statute section 106-399.5167 authorizes the state
veterinarian or his representative to stop and inspect any individual or
vehicle if there is probable cause to believe the person or moving vehicle
traveling into or within the state is carrying any animal or item capable of
transmitting a contagious animal disease. 168 FMD can be transferred on the
clothes of a person.' 6 9 Consequently, the maximum power envisioned by
the General Assembly-warrantless search and seizure of any individualcould be exercised to contain a case of FMD. Granting such power is
U.S.
within the bounds of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
71
Constitution' 70 and is consistent with other North Carolina statutes.'
A.

"Administrative" or "Emergency" Search?

It is important to note initially the potential to assess the warrantless
search' power authorized by section 106-399.5 under two separate
theories. Under the first option, the warrantless search power is authorized
under a statutory regulatory scheme designed to maintain livestock health
and economic safety.'73 The fact that the power is granted to an

167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.5 (2003). The powers and provisions included in S.B. 779
will be addressed in their statutory form.

168. Id.
169. N.C. CHART, supra note 18.
170. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
171. This Comment addresses the warrantless search and seizure power authorized under
section 106-399.5. Section 106-399.4 authorizes the veterinarian to "enter any property in the
State to examine any animal that the State Veterinarian has reasonable grounds to believe is
infected with or exposed to a contagious animal disease." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.4(d)
(2003). A warrantless section 399.4(d) entry is subject to the same constitutional analysis as a
search under section 399.5.
172. When this Comment refers to "searches," the assessment applies to searches and
seizures.
173. This Comment does not consider in depth the justification for the warrantless search
power as a component of a regulatory scheme. However, it is important to note that this
justification may be required to defend the power in full. While this Comment focuses on
containment of an individual case and prevention of an outbreak, the veterinarian's powers can
also be used to implement and conduct a post-containment eradication program. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 106-399.4(a) (2003) (establishing the veterinarian's ability to "develop and implement
any emergency measures and procedures ... necessary to prevent and control the animal
disease."). This distinction presents line-drawing problems. It is unclear exactly when an
emergency quarantine transitions into a presumably longer-lasting eradication program.
Warrantless searches used within an eradication program would need to meet the three-element
test articulated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) and endorsed by the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina in State v. Sapatch, 108 N.C. App. 321, 423 S.E.2d 510 (1992): one, the
government must have a substantial interest in the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the
inspection is being made; two, the warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the
scheme; and three, the regulatory scheme must be able to serve as a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant. See id. at 324, 423 S.E.2d at 512 (1992) (quoting New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987)). Administrative searches are also considered in State v. Nobles,
107 N.C. App. 627, 422 S.E.2d 78, 80 (1992) and Durham Video and News, Inc. v. Durham
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administrative agent, the state veterinarian,174 supports this approach. The
second option addresses the warrantless search power as an exception to
the ability to conduct a
the traditional search and seizure power:
17 5
The "exigent
circumstances.
warrantless search in exigent
circumstances" approach does not consider the power as a component of a
larger regulatory scheme; instead, it justifies the absence of a warrant based
on the surrounding circumstances.' 76
The warrantless search authority of section 106-399.5 should be
examined under the second approach. The warrantless search power can
only be "triggered" by emergency conditions.'7 7 The "triggering" provision
indicates the General Assembly envisioned the exercise of this power only
under a precise condition-an emergency scenario-rather than as part of a
continuous regulatory scheme. Accordingly, warrantless searches should
be assessed under the exigent circumstances exception.
B.

Exigent CircumstancesException

In constitutional language, an emergency scenario is considered an
exigent circumstance. State v. Nance,178 decided in 2002 by the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina, supports the validity of warrantless searches in
The defendant in Nance was convicted of
exigent situations.' 79
8 ' Starving horses were seized from her farm
cruelty.
misdemeanor animal
without a warrant.'' The court held that the situation did not amount to the
82
sort of exigent circumstances necessary to justify a warrantless search;
however, the court generally defined the circumstances required to meet the
exigent circumstances exception. 8 3 The court noted that warrantless
Board of Adjustment, 144 N.C. App. 236, 240, 550 S.E.2d 212, 214 (2001). In addition, it is
particularly important to note a non-North Carolina case, Gleaves v. Waters, 220 Cal. Rptr. 621,
624-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a warrantless inspection of plaintiffs' yard, pursuant to a
state program attempting to eradicate Japanese Beetles, to be unconstitutional).
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.5 (2003).
175. See State v. Nance, 149 N.C. App. 734, 743-44, 562 S.E.2d 557, 564 (2002) (balancing
the need for action and the individual's tights in determining the existence of exigent
circumstances for warrantless searches) (citing State v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976)); see

also Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (enumerating types of circumstances that
qualify as "exigent").
176. Id.
177. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.5 (2003) (mandating identification of imminent threat
and requiring consultation with the Agriculture Commissioner and approval of the Governor
before initiating warrantless searches); see also infra Part VI (discussing the "trigger" elements
further).
178. 149 N.C. App. 734, 562 S.E.2d 557 (2002).
179. Id. at 743, 562 S.E.2d at 563-64.
180. Id. at 735, 562 S.E.2d at 559.
181. Id. at 737, 562 S.E.2d at 560.
182. Id. at 744, 562 S.E.2d at 564.
183. Id. at 743, 562 S.E.2d at 563-64.
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searches are allowed if the situation demands immediate or unusual
action:"
"[E]xigent circumstances exist where the need for immediate
action is so great as to outweigh the potential infringement of a defendant's
rights under the Fourth Amendment ..."
,185
The animal cruelty statute in Nance did not expressly authorize
warrantless searches, so the court considered the state's action under the
traditional Fourth Amendment criminal investigation rubric rather than
addressing the constitutionality of a statutory provision authorizing a
warrantless search."8 6 Nevertheless, the Nance analysis is applicable to
section 106-399.5, which expressly authorizes warrantless searches. The
North Carolina General Assembly cannot authorize inspection power in
conflict with the U.S. Constitution.'87 Therefore, any warrantless power
granted by statute for use in emergency situations must at least be able to
pass the exigent circumstances test noted in Nance to be justified as an
emergency exception to the general constitutional rule.
The warrantless search power of section 106-399.5 meets the Nance
standard. The threat posed by a potentially unchecked FMD or MCD
outbreak creates a substantial need for immediate action. 8 ' The economic
effect of an FMD or MCD outbreak would be catastrophic.' 89 Therefore,
the potential damage to the state outweighs the individual privacy interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
While North Carolina courts have not extensively addressed the
constitutionality of a warrantless search in the context of a threat to
agriculture, federal courts have examined the issue. Federal case law also
supports the warrantless search power granted to the state veterinarian.
The United States Supreme Court noted that the "exigent circumstances"
exception allowed for warrantless destruction of tubercular cattle.' 90 In
Camara v. Municipal Court9' a California resident challenged the state's
power to conduct warrantless inspections as part of a home inspection
program.' 92 After finding the California law in conflict with the Fourth
Amendment, the Court noted that nothing in Camara invalidated the power
to conduct warrantless searches and seizures in emergency situations.' 93 It

184. Id.
185. Id. at 743-44, 562 S.E.2d at 564.
186. Id. at 741-42, 562 S.E.2d at 562-63.
187. U.S. CONST. art. VI (establishing the U.S. Constitution as the supreme law of the land).
188. See supra Part IA-B.
189. See supra Part I.C-E.
190. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (citing Kroplin v. Truax, 165 N.E. 498
(Ohio 1929)).
191. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
192. Id. at 525.
193. Id. at 539.
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emergency
specifically endorsed warrantless searches used in response to
94
cattle.
in
tuberculosis
of
outbreak
an
as
such
health situations,
The Ninth Circuit applied the emergency exception rationale to a
warrantless quarantine inspection in 1972.191 United States v. Schafer196
held that warrantless searches of passenger luggage for agriculture products
that could transmit potentially devastating plant diseases were
constitutional.19 7 The passenger was leaving Hawaii during a time that
Hawaii was under federal quarantine, and the warrantless inspections were
authorized by statute. 98 The court noted a rationale for the federal
quarantine similar to the reasoning underlying an FMD or MCD response:
The objects of the search (quarantined fruits, vegetables, and plants)
can easily be transported out of Hawaii to the continental United
States by departing tourists. The effect of such movement on
agricultural crops in the mainland states could be serious, as each of
the quarantined items may carry some form of plant disease or insect
which could destroy crops in the other areas. The purpose of the
quarantine is to avoid these effects by preventing the movement of
the potentially dangerous plant substances. 99
The court found that searches were justified based on the "likelihood that
persons departing the quarantine area at that point will be carrying one or
more of the plant substances" as opposed to being based on a reason to
suspect the particularperson searched. 0 Individualized probable cause, in
this context, need not be demonstrated to justify a warrantless search.
In 1996, the exigent circumstances exception was again examined in
In Rohrig, the Sixth Circuit upheld a
United States v. Rohrig.2 °'
warrantless search of a home after officers responded to complaints about
loud music being played from the house in the early hours of the
morning. 2°2 The court detailed the specific sorts of exigent circumstances
that have been recognized as exceptions.2 3 The Rohrig court highlighted
the "risk of danger" version of the "exigent circumstances" exception-

194. See id. (referring to seizure of unwholesome food, compulsory smallpox vaccination,
health quarantines, and the destruction of diseased cattle as examples).
195. United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 858.
198. Id. at 857-58.
199. Id. at 858.
200. Id. at 859.
201. 1996 FED App. 0346P, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996).
202. Id. at 2, 98 F.3d at 1509.
203. Id. at 15, 98 F.3d at 1515 (discussing four general categories of exigent circumstances:
(1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (2) imminent destruction of evidence; (3) prevention of a
suspect's escape; and (4) risk of danger to police or others).
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where the potential danger posed by a certain set of circumstances justifies
the warrantless search-and found this rationale to be the most frequently
cited by the Supreme Court to justify "cases where the Government is
acting in something other than a traditional law enforcement capacity.
Although Rohrig was addressing a warrantless search of a home, the court
cited the slaughter of diseased cattle as an example of this sort of
situation.0 5
Federal case law, therefore, supports the constitutionality of the
warrantless search power. The federal courts that have addressed the issue
note both the continued existence of the "exigent circumstances"
exception-in particular, the "risk of danger" version-and the
applicability of that exception in the context of diseased cattle.
Authorizing the state veterinarian to conduct warrantless searches and
seizures is also consistent with case law from other states. In the 1980 case
People v. Dickinson, °6 the California Court of Appeal upheld the
constitutionality of a quarantine statute targeting pests that posed a threat to
agriculture. 2 7 The statute authorized the agriculture director to establish
"quarantine inspection stations for the purpose of inspecting all
conveyances which might carry plants or other things which are, or are
liable to be infested or infected with any pest. ' 208 The court noted the
critical role the inspection stations played in the quarantine regulation.0 9
The court limited its holding to the facts of the case: it upheld the power to
request permission to search, and if permission was granted, to search the
trunks of vehicles passing through the inspection stations. 1 0 It did not
address the constitutionality of the broader search power."'
Three years later, the California Court of Appeal upheld a warrantless
204. Id. at 16, 98 F.3d at 1516.
205. Id. at 16-17, 98 F.3d at 1516 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967))
(connecting the slaughter of diseased cattle to the "risk of danger" exception). The court found
the "risk of danger" exception inapplicable to the Rohrig facts. Id. at 23, 98 F.3d at 1519.
However, the court continued to note that the list of exceptions to the warrant requirement is not
"fixed and immutable." Id. By referring back to the fundamental principles of warrant
requirement exceptions, id. at 24-26, 98 F.3d at 1520-21, the court held that the search of
defendant's home, while not fitting into one of the recognized exceptions was still reasonable
and, therefore, constitutional. See id. at 35, 98 F.3d at 1525. The loud music, at that time of
morning, was recognized as a nuisance that in some circumstances the government has an interest
in curtailing. Id. at 26, 98 F.3d at 1522.
206. 163 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
207. Id. at 576.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 577 (highlighting the importance of agriculture, the threat posed by the insects, and
past success of the quarantine checkpoints).
210. Id. at 579.
211. Id. The Court of Appeals of Arizona reached the same conclusion on similar facts. State
v. Bailey, 586 P.2d 648, 650 (Ariz. 1978).
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search of a vehicle at a quarantine checkpoint on broader grounds. The
Governor had quarantined three counties to contain and eradicate an
infestation of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly, a threat to agriculture.212 The
court noted that the warrant requirement was "simply incompatible with the
success of the quarantine method of eradication. 213 The emergency
situation justifying the quarantine also justified the warrantless search
power.1 4
State courts have also considered warrantless search authority in
relation to animal cruelty statutes. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found
a warrantless search and seizure, conducted on a farm to prevent further
21 6
cruelty to horses, did not violate the Constitution.25 In State v. Bauer,
the court tied the justification for the warrantless action to the compelling
need to preserve the lives of the endangered horses.2 1 7 It laid out a two-part
test to determine if a warrantless search falls within the emergency
exception: was the officer motivated by a need to render aid or assistance,
and would a reasonable person under the circumstances have thought an
emergency existed. 1 8
In Commonwealth v. Hurd,219 another cruelty case, while deciding that
the emergency exception did not extend to cover threats to animals, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court noted, in broad terms, the applicability of the
exception when the threat was posed by an animal.22° It found, "If a...
dangerous animal presents an imminent threat of death or serious injury to
persons, an animal control officer (or police officer) may enter premises
without a warrant to remove the threat. '221 While there is no indication that
the court contemplated the potential transfer of disease as a source of the
threat, the broad language supports the application of the emergency
exception to the warrant requirement in the contagious animal disease
212. People v. Guardado, 194 Cal. Rptr. 598, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), withdrawn pursuant
to Rule 976 of the California Rules of Appellate Procedure.

213. Id. at 601.
214. Id.
215. State v. Bauer, 379 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). Decisions involving
warrantless searches used to prevent animal cruelty do not consistently hold the power to search
constitutional. In Brinkley v. County of Flagler,769 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), the
Florida Court of Appeal upheld a warrantless search of a farm and seizure of animals when "any
reasonable person would also have concluded that an urgent and immediate need for protective
action was warranted." Id. at 472. However, in Commonwealth v. Hurd, 743 N.E. 2d 841 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2001), the Appeals Court of Massachusetts declined to recognize the extension of the
emergency principle to animals. Id. at 846.
216. 379 N.W.2d 895 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
217. Id. at 898.
218. Id.
219. 743 N.E. 2d 841 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001).
220. Id. at 846.
221. Id.
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context.
While not controlling decisions, other states' courts have handed
down rulings that would support the constitutionality of S.B. 779 if the
legislation were challenged in North Carolina courts. In general terms,
these decisions have tied the constitutionality of a warrantless search to the
emergency nature of the situation. In particular, courts have upheld the
exercise of the emergency, warrantless search in the context of quarantines
designed to protect agriculture. In addition, in a related scenario, addressed
under the same rubric, courts have upheld searches when the emergency
was the suffering of one animal-an emergency substantially less
significant than a threat to the entire economy of the state. The reasoning
of these opinions, especially when viewed collectively, demonstrates the
constitutionality of the warrantless search power authorized in section 160399.5.
C.

North CarolinaStatutes

Similar warrantless search and seizure powers are authorized in
numerous North Carolina statutes.22 For example, in emergencies, the
state health director can demand the health records of persons potentially
infected with a communicable disease without a warrant; 223 fire
departments are not required to seek warrants; 224 hazardous waste and
terrorist response teams can enter property without a warrant; 25 and local
governments may conduct warrantless searches while inspecting curfew
violations.226 Warrantless searches related to agriculture have also been
authorized within the inspection context. 227 The existence of these statutes
is not direct evidence of the constitutionality of the warrantless search
power in the quarantine context but does demonstrate a history of linking
the warrantless search power with emergency situations in North Carolina.

222. Some examples are from documents provided to the House Agriculture Committee. See
Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on S.B. 779 Before the Senate
Agriculture/Environment/NaturalResources Committee, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2001).
223. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-144(b) (2003).
224. State v. Langley, 64 N.C. App. 674, 678, 308 S.E.2d 445, 448 (1983) (interpreting N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-82-1).
225. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-25 (2004).
226. See State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 501, 178 S.E.2d 449, 459 (1971) (holding that an
officer has a reasonable belief that a person out after curfew, in violation of a local ordinance, is
committing a misdemeanor in his presence).
227. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.71 (2004) (authorizing warrantless boll weevil
eradication and inspection).
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Conclusion

Section 106-399.5 authorizes the state veterinarian to conduct
warrantless searches and seizures in emergency situations. 2 ' This power is
consistent with other North Carolina statutes and is within constitutional
limits. The Supreme Court and lower courts recognize an "exigent
circumstances" exception to the Constitution's warrant requirement. The
discovery of a contagious animal disease in livestock has been recognized
as an emergency sufficient to justify warrantless searches.2 9 Warrantless
searches are constitutional to the extent that they are a response to the
threat posed. 23 Section 106-399.5 allows the exercise of the warrantless
search power only as a response to an emergency; therefore, any authorized
warrantless search by the veterinarian falls within the "exigent
circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement and is constitutional.
IV. THE EXPANDED QUARANTINE POWER

In addition to the power to conduct warrantless searches and seizures,
the 2001 legislation increased the quarantine power of the state
veterinarian. The quarantine power granted to the state veterinarian under
section 106-401 differs significantly from the power previously vested in
the office under 106-401".231 Whereas the veterinarian was previously
allowed to quarantine only at the individual farm-level, the 2001 legislation
grants the authority to quarantine "areas within the State. 232 The
imposition of a quarantine prohibits the movement of animals within the
area and, especially, across the boundary of the defined area.233 Case law
addressing the size of a quarantined area supports the validity of section
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.5 (2003).
229. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); United States v. Rohrig, 1996
FED App. 0346P, 16-17, 98 F.3d 1506, 1516 (6th Cir. 1996).
230. See, e.g., State v. Nance, 149 N.C. App. 734, 743-44, 562 S.E.2d 557, 564 (2002) (citing
the need for immediate action as justification for the warrantless search); State v. Bauer, 379
N.W.2d 895, 898 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (citing the compelling need to preserve the life of the
animal as justification for the warrantless search).
231. Because the legislation included a sunset provision, the statutes are reported in duplicate.
When this Comment refers to the newly granted powers, effective until 2005, it will use the term
"section 106-401." When a comparison is needed, the old version, which will become effective
in 2005, will be referred to as "section 106-401*."
232. See Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 2, § 106-401(b), 2001 Sess. Laws 14, 16 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401(b)) (adding the expanded quarantine power to the
existing power). The original quarantine provisions of § 106-401* authorized quarantines of
individual animals and contemplated a notice method based on individual premises. See id.
§ 106-401(a) (marking up the original statute with the new provisions of S.B. 779). This
Comment recognizes that no provision in 106-401* prohibits quarantining a larger area by
quarantining multiple contiguous, smaller areas. Whether this repeated use of 106-401 * power
achieves a result potentially outside legislative intent is beyond this the scope of this Comment.
233. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401 (2003).
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106-401.
A.

QuarantinePower and ContagiousAnimal Diseases

Courts have considered the constitutionality of quarantine authority
used to contain the spread of animal diseases. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina addressed the constitutionality of the quarantine power in 1947.234
State v. Lovelace235 involved state regulations intended to prevent the
36
spread of brucellosis, also known as Bang's disease, in North Carolina.1
Brucellosis, a cattle disease, has features in common with FMD and MCD.
The disease normally spreads animal-to-animal but can also be transferred
to humans.237 Containment of the disease requires slaughter of the infected
animal and often slaughter of the entire herd of cattle. 38 The State Board
of Agriculture authorized quarantine officers to arrest any person illegally
importing cattle into North Carolina.2 39 The court upheld this particular
cattle regulation and the power of the state in general to regulate agriculture
as a means of containing contagious animal diseases.24 ° The court found
that state regulations such as these, made under the police power, were not
in conflict with the Federal Constitution as long as they are "reasonable in
their scope and incidence"24 1 and reasonably targeted to the desired end.242
To this second point, the court noted that statutes should be assessed "in
light of the evil sought to be remedied. 243
In Smith v. St. Louis2 "4 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Texas quarantine system established to prevent the
As in Lovelace, the Court tied the
spread of anthrax in cattle.
constitutionality of the state power directly to the situation requiring state
action.2 45 The Court wrote:
Quarantine regulations cannot be the same for cattle as for persons,
and must vary with the nature of the disease to be defended against.
As the Supreme Court of Tennessee [sic] said: "The necessities of
such cases often require prompt action. If too long delayed the end
234. State v. Lovelace, 228 N.C. 186, 45 S.E.2d 48 (1947).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 189, 45 S.E.2d at50.
237. Id. at 189, 45 S.E.2d at 49.
238. Id. at 188-89, 45 S.E.2d at 49-50.
239. See id. (noting the authority of the State Board of Agriculture to make the regulation and
the indictment of the defendant by quarantine officers).
240. Id. at 189-91, 45 S.E.2d at 50-51.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 190, 45 S.E.2d at 51.
243. Id.
244. 181 U.S. 248 (1901).
245. See Smith v. St. Louis & Southwestern Ry. Co., 181 U.S. 248, 258 (1901) ("It isthe
character of the circumstances which gives or takes from a... quarantine a legal quality.").
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to be attained by the exercise of the power to declare a quarantine
may be defeated, and irreparable injury done.246
Smith and Lovelace demonstrate general judicial support for a broad
quarantine power. These decisions establish an approach that assesses a
particular quarantine in light of a particular threat. By adopting this
method, the courts, as they do in the context of warrantless searches and
seizures, link necessity and constitutionality. In general terms at least, as
long as the exercise of the power remains within an acceptable scope, as
defined by the nature of the threat, broad quarantine authority, such as the
power authorized in section 106-401, is constitutional.
B.

GeographicalLimitations on QuarantinePower

Quarantines often, if not always, are implemented within defined
geographical limits. Accordingly, challenges to the constitutionality of
quarantines often center on the appropriateness of the geographical bounds.
North Carolina's response to the threat posed by FMD and MCD includes
authorizing the state veterinarian to quarantine "areas within the State. 247
Prior to the 2001 legislation the state veterinarian's quarantine power was
limited to quarantining individual premises.248 Two Supreme Court of
North Carolina decisions support the constitutionality of the expanded
quarantine provision. In 1906, the court in State v. Southern Railway

246. Id. at 257-58 (quoting St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Smith, 49 S.W. 627, 632 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1899)). The Supreme Court also upheld quarantine laws related to contagious animal
diseases when challenged as being in violation of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Rasmussen v.
Idaho, 181 U.S. 198, 202 (1901) (upholding a statute prohibiting the importation of diseased
sheep into Idaho); Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1889) (finding constitutional a
prohibition of cattle feared to be infected with Texas fever). A challenge based on a federal
preemption argument has also failed. Reid v. Colo., 187 U.S. 137, 147 (1902). However, it is
important to note that there are limitations placed on state police power. Statutes that purport to
protect the state from infectious diseases but are truly simple restraints on trade are
unconstitutional. R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1877). In general, the power to
quarantine has often been recognized as a legitimate exercise of state power. See, e.g.,
Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387
(1902) ("[U]ntil Congress has exercised its power on the subject, such state quarantine laws and
state laws for the purpose of preventing, eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or
");Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
infectious diseases, are not repugnant to the Constitution ....
203 (1824) ("They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation.., not surrendered to the
general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves.
Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description ...are component parts of this
mass."). See Edward A. Fallone, Note, Preservingthe Public Health: A Proposalto Quarantine
Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers,68 B.U.L. REV. 441, 463-67 (1988), for further discussion of the
constitutional issues surrounding the power to quarantine people.
247. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401(b) (2003).
248. See Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 2, § 106-401(a), 2001 Sess. Laws 14, 16 (marking
up the original statute with S.B. 799's new provisions).
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Company249 upheld the legitimacy of the quarantine power. 250 Defendant
was convicted of shipping cattle across the quarantine line established by
the State Agriculture Commissioner. 25 The goal of the quarantine was the
253
25 2
elimination of Spanish fever and other contagious animal diseases.
The authorizing legislation granted the Agriculture Commissioner the
power to quarantine infected animals and regulate the transportation of
livestock." 4 The quarantine lines traced the political boundaries of
counties, and the quarantine area consisted of a large portion of the state. 5
The court held the creation of "cattle districts" to be a reasonable
regulation, noting that the quarantine was "calculated to effectuate the end
and purpose of the law. "256
In addition, State v. Hodges257 decided in 1920, also addressed state
regulations aimed at the elimination of Spanish fever.258 The quarantine
provision included broad language meant to allow the Agriculture
Commissioner to target any infectious or contagious disease that could
break out among livestock.2 59 The court noted that the "eradication of the
cattle tick is a matter of national importance. 260 It documented, in
particular, that ticks spread the disease animal-to-animal. 26' The court
upheld the power of the state to authorize a quarantine encompassing entire
counties and the power of the Agriculture Commissioner to implement the
law. 62
As these decisions relate to the power authorized by statute in 2001,
they signal a judicial comfort with large quarantine districts.
The

significant change in the state veterinarian's ability to quarantineallowing larger "areas within the State" to be quarantined2 63-is

within

249. 141 N.C. 846, 54 S.E. 294 (1906).
250. Id. at 850-52, 54 S.E. at 296.
251. Id. at 851, 54 S.E. at 296.
252. Spanish fever, often referred to as Texas fever, was a cattle disease passed from Texas
cattle, which remained unaffected, to cattle from other geographic areas. See The Handbook of
Texas Online: Texas Fever, at http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/TT/
awtl.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004), for more information on Spanish fever (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
253. S. Ry. Co., 141 N.C. at 851-52, 54 S.E. at 296.
254. Id. at 850-51, 54 S.E. at 296.
255. See id. at 851, 54 S.E. at 296 (noting quarantine area defined by county lines).
256. Id. at 851-52, 54 S.E. at 296.
257. 180 N.C. 751, 105 S.E. 417 (1920).
258. Id. at 752-53, 105 S.E. at 417.
259. Id. at 751-52, 105 S.E. at417-18.
260. Id. at 754, 105 S.E. at 418; see also State v. Garner, 158 N.C. 630, 631, 74 S.E. 458,
458-59 (1912) (upholding a conviction for allowing a cow to stray over the quarantine line and
discussing the importance of the quarantine line in the effort to eradicate the cattle tick).
261. Hodges, 180 N.C. at 756, 105 S.E. at 420.
262. Id. at 753-54, 105 S.E. at418.
263. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 2, § 106-401(b), 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 16 (codified
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constitutional bounds according to North Carolina case law.
Federal decisions also directly support the constitutionality of the
expanded quarantine power. Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hailowell,26 a
1987 Third Circuit decision, directly addressed the constitutionality of state
quarantine power in the context of contagious animal disease. 265 Empire
Kosher Poultry sought compensation for economic losses associated with a
266
quarantine implemented by the Pennsylvania Agriculture Department.
At issue was a quarantine enforced by the state due to the discovery of
avian influenza. 267 Avian influenza is a disease that affects poultry but not
humans. 68 Poultry that test positive for the disease are slaughtered to
prevent further spread. 269 The eradication program was necessary to save
the ten billion dollar poultry industry.
Initially, only the infected
premises were quarantined, but containment of the highly contagious
disease ultimately required the quarantine area to be extended to cover
several counties.27 1 The quarantine zone was expanded again one month
later. 2
Empire Kosher Poultry challenged the quarantine on substantive due
process grounds. 273 The substantive due process challenge was based on
the relationship between the regulation and the regulatory goal. Empire
Kosher Poultry argued that there was an inadequate rational relationship
between the quarantine and protection of the industry.274 Among other
arguments, the plaintiffs argued that the "geographical perimeters of the
quarantine zone are too broad. 2 75 The court, however, found the argument
to be "without merit." 276 It noted that the "boundaries were selected to
cover areas of known infection and to include a five-mile buffer zone so
that they could be readily identifiable, thereby avoiding poultry being

as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401(b)).
264. 816 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1987).
265. Id. at 909.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 911 (noting the destruction of a flock found to have avian influenza).
270. Id. at 909.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 910.
273. Id. at 912-13. A party arguing that a regulation or statute fails to comport with the
substantive requirements of due process will prevail if it demonstrates "that there is no rational
connection between the regulation and the interest which the regulation promotes." Id. at 912
(citing Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979) (per curiam); Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976)).
274. Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc., 816 F.2d at 912-13.
275. Id. at913.
276. Id.
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'
Finding
inadvertently shipped through or out of the quarantine areas."277

that the size of the quarantine zone had a "real and substantial relation" to
the object of the regulation and that the size was not unreasonable, the
court held Pennsylvania exercised its quarantine power consistent with
constitutional requirements.278
The constitutionality of the Pennsylvania avian influenza quarantine
27 9
was again upheld in Case v. United States Department of Agriculture.

The plaintiffs challenged the border and size of the quarantine area. 280 The
court found the quarantine rational, noting the importance of the state being
administer the quarantine zone, and avoid
able to easily identify the border,
281
area.
quarantine
a "patchwork
The rationale of the federal district court is applicable in the MCD and
FMD quarantine context. The Case and Empire Kosher courts assessed the
constitutionality of the quarantine by considering the size of the quarantine
in relation to both the significance of the threat and the requirements of a
successful quarantine. Applying the courts' rationale to section 106-401
yields results identical to Case and Empire Kosher Poultry: the power to
quarantine a large section of a state is not per se unconstitutional, and the
constitutionality of a particular application of the power is judged in
relation to its purpose and its administrative requirements.
Other state courts have also upheld the expanded quarantine power.
In the 1899 case St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Smith,282 the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals noted that the quarantine of cities during a
contagious disease outbreak was an almost annual occurrence.283 Smith v.
State,284 another Texas case, decided in 1914, upheld the validity of a
statute authorizing the Texas Sanitary Commission to "establish, maintain
and enforce quarantine lines wherever they deemed it necessary to protect
the domestic animals of this State from Texas splenetic fever and from all
contagious and infectious diseases of a communicable character. "285 in
1928, then-Judge Cardozo writing for the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Teuscher2 86 upheld a New York regulation in which the "plan of
277. Id.
278. See id. at 912-13 (setting forth the tests applied to a statute to determine its
constitutionality under the Due Process Clause and holding that the state regulation in question
was constitutional according to those guidelines).
279. 642 F. Supp. 341, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1986), affd, 829 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1987) (unpublished

table decision).
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 345.
See id. (quoting from defendants' brief).
49 S.W. 627 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
Id. at 632.
168 S.W. 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914).
Id.
162 N.E. 484 (N.Y. 1928).
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the statute [was] to make the township the territorial unit in the war upon
'
unhealthy cattle."287
In describing an eradication plan using a county-based
2
88
approach,
he endorsed the power of the State to "establish such
subdivisions as it chose in its war upon disease. 289 In 1936, the Supreme
The New
Court of New Hampshire decided Dederick v. Smith. 29"
Hampshire court found a state statute authorizing the Agriculture
Commissioner to establish quarantine zones within the state, even if the
divided the entire state into quarantine zones, to be
eradication approach
"unobjectionable. ''29' The court noted the connection between the statute's
purpose, the eradication of bovine tuberculosis, and its means, the
quarantine and testing powers.292 It found that since such state powers were
constitutional when only aimed to prevent economic harm, the powers must
be constitutional when the targeted disease had the potential to infect
humans.293
As the New York and New Hampshire examples indicate, other states'
courts, even if the decisions are somewhat dated,294 have determined that
quarantine statutes similar to section 106-401 were constitutional. The
courts upheld the authorization of quarantine systems targeted to protect
the livestock of the state even when the systems created large quarantine
districts. Again, the constitutionality was based on the relationship
between the purpose of the regulation and its approach. The aggressive
quarantine approach was justified by the serious threat of a contagious
animal disease. The justification was amplified when the disease posed a
threat to human health. 95 In the modem era, the threat posed by FMD and
MCD is comparable; consequently, an aggressive quarantine approach
authorizing the state veterinarian to quarantine large "areas within the
State" is constitutional.
C.

The QuarantinePower: People,Animals, or Both?

Before concluding, it is interesting to note that section 106-401(b)
does not expressly authorize the state veterinarian to control the movement
287. Id. at 485.

288. Id. at 485-86.
289. Id. at 461, 162 N.E. at 486.
290. 184 A. 595 (N.H. 1936).
291. Id. at 599.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Many decisions noted in this section and other sections of this Comment were handed
down in the early Twentieth Century or earlier. While not current, the decisions are especially
relevant because they were made while the nation and each state were threatened by an outbreak
of numerous contagious cattle diseases. The similarity between then and now makes the
constitutional analysis relevant.
295. Dederick, 184 A. at 599.
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of people. 296 The statute notes:
As part of the quarantine under this subsection, the State
Veterinarian or an authorized representative may enter any property
in the State to examine any animal, to obtain blood and tissue
samples for testing for the animal disease, and for any other reason
directly related to preventing or controlling the animal disease, and
may stop motor vehicles on a public or private road.297
The word "part" implies that the list of specific powers is not meant to be a
complete list of the powers available under the general quarantine power.
The first two listed powers pertain to the power to control animals, but the
third power implies that the quarantine power can be used to control
people.2 98
There is no definition of "quarantine" included in the Animal Disease
article of section 106.299 The only time "quarantine" is directly defined in
the North Carolina statutes is in section 130A-2(7a), which lays out a broad
definition authorizing the control of both people and animals.3"' Section
130A-2 introduces the definition by noting that "[t]he following definitions
shall apply throughout this Chapter," but does not expressly limit the
applicability only to the Public Health chapter.30 ' The quarantine definition
of 130A-2 was added in 2002, after the expanded quarantine authority was
granted to the state veterinarian. 3 2 The lack of a clear definition in section
106, the reference to the power to control vehicles, the provision of a
partial rather than complete list of powers, and the later inclusion of the
power to control people in the public health context, leaves open the
question of whether, and if so, to what extent, the quarantine power
33
authorized under section 106-401 includes the power to control people.
296. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401(b) (2003). The legislative intent to authorize the power to
control animals is without dispute. See id. ("No animal subject to the quarantine shall be moved
to any other premises." (emphasis added)). Surrounding statutes also support this conclusion.
See id. § 106-400.1 (authorizing the state veterinarian to quarantine swine); id. § 106-401.1
(authorizing the state veterinarian to quarantine poultry).
297. Id. § 106-401(b) (emphasis added).
298. See id. (establishing the power to stop motor vehicles).
299. See id. §§ 106-304 to 106-405.20 (including no quarantine definition).
300. Id. § 130A-2(7a) (defining quarantine as it applies, at least, to the power of the state
health director).
301. Id. § 130A-2.
302. Act of Oct. 3, 2002, ch. 179, sec. 4, § 130A-2(7a), 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 803, 808
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-2(7A) (defining "quarantine authority")).
303. This Comment does not address the issue of whether the constitutionality of the
quarantine power is impacted by whether it controls the movement of people whose actions do
not bring them into contact with livestock. The Raleigh News & Observer's description of the
state's potential reaction clearly contemplates a quarantine that regulates the movement of people.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text. If this is the case, constitutional analysis would have
to consider whether due process protection for liberty, not just property, impacts the

HIGH STEAKS

2004]

D.

Conclusion

The expanded quarantine power-the power to quarantine large areas
of the state as opposed to individual premises-was a controversial aspect
of the 2001 legislation. Nevertheless, the expanded power is constitutional.
When challenged in the courts based on their size, large quarantine areas
have been upheld. Courts have based their holdings on the reasonableness
of the area in relation to the threat posed by the disease. 3" As long as the
regulation is found to be reasonable and connected to the threat, the
language from Smith v. State" 5 expresses the general approach of both
federal and state courts: states may "establish, maintain and enforce
quarantine lines wherever they [deem] it necessary."3

6

Threats to livestock

have been judicially recognized as significant enough to justify the
quarantine power.3"7 They have been cited as justification for quarantines

that encompass entire counties, and sometimes states.3 °s
The power granted under section 106-401 would survive a
constitutional challenge given the existing case law. The threat posed by
MCD and FMD is sufficiently similar to, if not greater than,3° the threats
previously addressed in litigation. Moreover, the size of the quarantine
districts already litigated is comparable to the size envisioned by the state
veterinarian. 10
V. THE POWER TO DESTROY LIVESTOCK WITHOUT NOTICE

An early amendment to S.B. 779 added the power to destroy livestock
without notice. 31 ' As amended, S.B. 779 reads, "In the event the owner of
the animal and the owner or operator of the premises cannot be notified, the
State Veterinarian or an authorized representative may seize and destroy
constitutionality of the quarantine provision or its exercise.
304. See, e.g., State v. S. Ry. Co., 141 N.C. 846, 851-52, 54 S.E. 294, 296 (1906) (noting the
quarantine was reasonably calculated to effectuate the purpose of the law); see also Empire
Kosher Poultry v. Hallowell, 816 F.2d 907, 912-13 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding the state regulation
constitutional based on the reasonableness of the quarantine area).
305. 168 S.W. 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914).
at 522.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., Dederick v. Smith, 184 A. 595, 599 (N.H. 1936) (finding eradication of bovine
tuberculosis sufficient justification).
308. See, e.g., State v. Lovelace, 228 N.C. 186, 189, 45 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1947) (endorsing a
quarantine used to keep infected cattle out of North Carolina); People v. Teuscher, 162 N.E. 484,
486 (N.Y. 1928) (supporting a county-based eradication plan).
309. FMD and MCD require the slaughtering of infected cattle, whereas "cattle tick" does
not. See United States v. Russell, 95 F.2d 684, 684 (5th Cir. 1938) (describing the process by
which ticks are removed from cattle).
310. See supra Part IV.B.
311. Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on S.B. 779 Before the
Senate Agriculture/Environment/NaturalResources Committee, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.

(N.C. 2001) (amendment proposed by Rep. Albertson).
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the animal."3 2 More than the other powers of S.B. 779, the power to seize,
and especially to destroy, livestock raises questions of government
deprivation of private property.313 Therefore, constitutional questions
surrounding the controversial power to destroy livestock without notice
center on the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that citizens not be
deprived of property without due process. Case law indicates that allowing
destruction without notification is within the constitutional boundaries that
limit legislative action. Moreover, comparable North Carolina statutes
authorize similar powers.
A.

Slaughter Without Notice

Only one North Carolina decision concerns the power to destroy
livestock without notice. In Hellen v. Noe," 4 decided in 1843, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina upheld the validity of a local ordinance authorizing
the constable to seize hogs running at large in the town. 3' 5 The hogs were
considered a nuisance. 3 6 The court found that running a public
advertisement and the "distress of the property" were sufficient to provide
notice before selling the hog.312 "Personal notice" was not necessary.3 8
Clearly, the power to destroy livestock without notice has not been
given extensive treatment by North Carolina courts, but the slight treatment
it has received supports the conclusion that destruction of livestock posing
a nuisance, without personal notice, is within constitutional bounds. The
destruction of livestock posing a more serious threat, as is the case with
FMD or MCD, would be supported by the same logic.
In contrast to the weak support found in North Carolina case law, the
United States Supreme Court in 1908 provided the strongest support for the
power to slaughter a potentially infected animal without giving prior notice
319
to the owner. The Court in North American Cold Storage v. Chicago

312. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 3, § 106-402.1(b), N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 18 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-402.1 (b)) (emphasis added).
313. S.B. 779 includes powers that when exercised deprive individuals of liberty and private
property. Each of the three controversial powers in some way involves some deprivation. In

simple terms, the quarantine power deprives individuals of liberty, the warrantless search and
seizure power deprives individuals of both liberty and property, and the power to destroy
livestock deprives individuals of private property.
314. 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 493 (1843).
315. Id. at 499.
316. See id. at 499-500 (discussing an ordinance authorizing the collection of loose hogs).
317. Id.
318. Id. State v. Harrell, 203 N.C. 210, 165 S.E. 551 (1932), supports this conclusion.
Harrell noted the validity of local ordinances directing local marshals to "kill all dogs found
running at large," but it did not discuss a notice requirement. See id. at 215, 165 S.E. at 553
(noting the Marshall's power to slaughter without attempting to contact the owners).
319. 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
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upheld the city of Chicago's power to seize and destroy "unwholesome or
putrid food" without first notifying the owner.3 20 The Court held that the
exercise of the police power by the city was not in conflict with the Due
It found that the
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.321
unwholesome food was a threat to the health and lives of the citizens.322
Summary destruction without notice, therefore, was justified as a means of
This principle both
preventing the danger posed by its existence. 3
validated earlier state court decisions 324 and provided the constitutional
foundation for decisions that followed. 5
Thirty years later, the holding in North American Cold Storage was
applied in the animal disease context. In Aguiar v. Brock,3 26 300
Californian cattle farmers challenged the constitutionality of the state
bovine tuberculosis eradication statute that authorized the slaughter of
infected cattle. 327 The federal district court, directly citing North American
Cold Storage, found that notice was not constitutionally required.32 8
Whether notice was required prior to destruction was a discretionary matter
to be determined by the California legislature.329
As Aguiar illustrates, federal decisions defend the constitutionality of
the authorization to slaughter potentially infected animals without notifying
the owner. In a situation similar to an FMD or MCD outbreak, a federal
district court in Aguiar found the reasoning of North American Cold
Storage applicable: if the animals posed a threat to the health and safety of
the community they could be destroyed without notice. Applying this
rationale in the case of FMD or MCD supports finding both the 2001
legislation empowering the veterinarian to destroy the animal and the
actual destruction of the potentially infected animal constitutional.
In cases decided both before and after North American Cold Storage,
numerous state courts have held that notice is not required before
320. See id. 315-16 (comparing the case at bar with earlier decisions and declaring "it is
proper to provide that food which is unfit for human consumption should be summarily seized
and destroyed"). The Court discusses the requirement of both notice and hearing in this opinion.
Id. at 317, 320. The Court's holding applies equally to both procedures.
321. Id. at 320.
322. See id. at 315 (noting the threat of unwholesome food).
323. Id. at 320.
324. See infra notes 330-36 and accompanying text.
325. See infra notes 337-47 and accompanying text.
326. 24 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
327. Id. at 692.
328. Id. at 694-95.
329. Id. at 694. The Fourth Circuit decided an animal destruction case more recently. In
Altman v. High Point, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003), the court upheld the killing of a stray dog.
Id. at 207. Plaintiff claimed that the killing of a pet dog was in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment, which the cases in the text concern. Id.
at 199.
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destruction of an animal posing a public threat. In 1888, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Newark and South Orange Horse Railway
Company v. Hunt330 considered a state statute authorizing the board of
health to destroy "all animals having contagious or infectious diseases."3 3'
The court found that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require notice
Three years later, the Supreme Court of
prior to destruction.332
Massachusetts issued a similar decision in Miller v. Horton,333 a case in
which a plaintiff sued for damages stemming from the killing of his
335
horse. 334 The horse was slaughtered after being diagnosed with glanders.
Then-State Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted the state's
power to destroy infected animals in emergencies.336
Opinions handed down after North American Cold Storage continued
to support the power to destroy without notification. The Supreme Court of
Iowa upheld the state power on numerous occasions. The court in 1913 in
Waud v. Crawford337 commented that in the case of a horse infected with a
contagious disease, the horse may be destroyed under the police power,
'
"without notice ... to prevent the spread of contagious diseases."338
Thirteen years later, the court considered a state attempt to eradicate bovine
tuberculosis in Fevold v. Webster County.339 The eradication approach
required the slaughter of infected cattle.34 ° The court found that the
legislature was not required to give cattle owners notice prior to
destruction.34 ' In Peverill v. Board of Supervisors,342 decided in 1929, the
court found that the testing of cattle and the destruction of infected cattle

330. 12 A. 697 (N.J. 1888).
331. Id. at 699.
332. Id. at 700-01.
333. 26 N.E. 100 (Mass. 1891). Miller is cited as support for the holding in North American
Cold Storage. N. Am. Cold Storage v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 318 (1908).
334. Miller, 26 N.E. at 100.
335. Id. Glanders is a sometimes-fatal disease that is traditionally found in horses and their
relatives. See Glanders: Essential Data, at http://www.cbwinfo.com/Biological/Pathogens/
BMa.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004), for more information on glanders (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
336. Miller, 26 N.E. at 101. Justice Holmes endorsed a post-slaughter hearing where the state
would pay the owner if the animal was found not to be diseased. Id. This Comment does not
address whether post-slaughter hearings are required under the Due Process Clause or whether
compensation, if available under the statute or required by the Constitution, should be based on
the animal's actual health or the reasonableness of the state's action.
337. 141 N.W. 1041 (Iowa 1913).
338. See id. at 1041 (finding that the police power could be exercised to fight contagious
diseases).
339. 210 N.W. 139 (Iowa 1926).
340. See id. at 140 (1926) (noting that some cattle would be "found advisable to slaughter").
341. Id. at 144.
342. 222 N.W. 535 (Iowa 1929).
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"without notice" was within the police power of the state.343 This case also
concerned the Iowa bovine tuberculosis statute. 344 In addition, the
3 45
California Court of Appeal in 1938 decided Affonso Brothers v. Brock.
Eight hundred cattle owners challenged the constitutionality of a California
statute that authorized the destruction of cattle infected with bovine
tuberculosis. 346 The court, in no uncertain terms, held:
Since the bovine tuberculosis statute is a valid exercise of the police
power enacted to preserve public health and welfare, the ...
summary slaughter of diseased dairy cattle, without previous notice
...

is lawful. Such summary destruction of diseased cattle is not a

violation of the due process clause of the federal or state Constitution
347

Like the sole North Carolina case and the federal opinions, decisions
from other states support the constitutionality of the summary destruction
power.
In each instance noted above, courts have resolved the
constitutional challenge in favor of allowing the particular destruction
regulation to remain in place. Powers similar to the North Carolina state
veterinarian's power to destroy infected, or potentially infected, livestock
without notice have been consistently held constitutional. The authority
included in the 2001 legislation should be viewed similarly.
B.

North CarolinaStatutes

While North Carolina decisions have not dealt extensively with the
issue of notice, there are a few North Carolina statutes concerning the
destruction of animals during an emergency or animals posing a health
threat. Although these statutes do not impact the constitutionality of the
new power to destroy livestock without notice, they demonstrate a history
of authorizing the exercise of similar power. For example, the state
veterinarian is authorized under section 106-307.7 to order the appropriate
local sheriff or other officer to kill any livestock roaming at large and
suspected of being infected with a contagious disease once it has been
determined that the livestock cannot be captured." The statute does not

343. Id. at 541; see also Loftus v. Dep't of Agric. of Iowa, 232 N.W. 412, 418 (Iowa 1930)
(considering again the bovine tuberculosis law and affirming Peverill).
344. Peverill, 222 N.W. at 540.
345. 84 P.2d 515 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
346. Id. at 517.
347. Id. at 519; see also Stickley v. Givens, 11 S.E.2d 631, 638 (Va. 1940) (considering the
abatement of nuisances and finding no constitutional rights other than those granted under the
state statute); Durand v. Dyson, 11l N.E. 143, 146 (Ill. 1915) (holding hearings, a procedure
often associated with notice, are not required prior to destruction of infected cattle).
348. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-307.7 (2003).
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require that the owner of the livestock be notified or that the veterinarian or
sheriff attempt to notify the owner. 49 Additionally, veterinarians are
required by section 130A-199350 to destroy animals diagnosed with rabies.
That statute also provides no mention of notice.351 In a similar situation,
section 130A-195 authorizes the destruction of "uncontrolled dogs and
cats" during a rabies quarantine without requiring notification.352 In
contrast, outside the emergency setting, under section 160A-186, domestic
animals running at large in violation of a city ordinance may only be
353
destroyed "after reasonable efforts to notify their owner.
C.

Conclusion

Destroying potentially infected animals without notice is a
constitutional exercise of state police power. The emergency situation
contemplated in the North Carolina contagious disease response legislation
is analogous to the situation considered in North American Cold Storage.
For example, an animal infected with FMD can potentially spread the
disease (the public harm) simply by being alive and coming in contact with
other animals. Containment does not end the threat. In North American
Cold Storage, the consumption of spoiled food (the public harm)354 could
theoretically be prevented by successful segregation of the property posing
the threat. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the power to destroy the
property without notice.35 With regard to contagious animal diseases, the
power to destroy without notice is, at least, equally justified since
successful segregation is not a guaranteed solution.
Moreover, in both situations, notifying the owner of the threatening
property would not change the outcome. Presumably, the spoiled food at
issue in North American Cold Storage was going to be destroyed regardless
of notice. Similarly, once diagnosed as infected or potentially infected, the
animal will be destroyed. The inevitability of destruction present in both
cases supports the applicability of the "no notice required" principle of
North American Cold Storage in the contagious animal situation.
While North Carolina courts have dealt little with the requirement of
notice before destruction of animals, other state courts have. These courts
have judged the power of the state to destroy potentially infected animals
without notice as being consistent with the Due Process Clause.
349. See id.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id. § 130A-199.
See id.
Id. § 130A-195.
Id. § 160A-186.
See N. Am. Cold Storage v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).
Id. at 320.
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Authorizing the destruction of livestock without notice is within the bounds
of the Constitution.
VI. THE TRIGGERING PROVISION

The state veterinarian is authorized to exercise the powers granted by
the 2001 legislation only if three conditions are met: the threat posed by
the animal disease must rise to the designated level, the veterinarian must
consult with the Agriculture Commissioner, and the Governor must give
his approval.356 The threat level is denoted as "an imminent threat within
the State of a contagious animal disease that has the potential for very
serious and rapid spread, is of serious socioeconomic and public health
consequence, or is of major importance in the international trade of animals
and animal products . . . ."I" The potential economic damage theoretically
associated with an FMD or MCD outbreak satisfies the damage element.358
The contagious nature of both diseases meets the requirement of a
potentially rapid spread.359 In addition, the vague nature of consultation
indicates that the second element would be easily met in an emergency.
The third aspect of the triggering provision carries with it more
controversy and questions. The Section below will concentrate on the
fundamental issue of whether the state veterinarian should be allowed to act
after simply consulting with the Governor or whether actual approval
should be required.36 ' As an examination of other North Carolina statutes,
case law, and policy considerations demonstrate, the decision to require
approval was appropriate.
A.

Authorization to Act

It is useful to initially note the nature of the Governor's approval. The
statute reads: "When determined by the State Veterinarian, in consultation
with the Commissioner of Agriculture and with the approval of the
Governor, that there is an imminent threat .... 3, 62 The Governor is asked
356. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.4 (2003). Although created by different sections,
the new powers discussed in Parts III, IV, and V are triggered by the same language. See Act of
Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106).
357. Id.
358. See supra Part I.C-E.
359. See N.C. CHART, supra note 18.

360. This Comment does not explore the level of communication between two officials
required to qualify as "consultation." Instead, the analysis below operates under the simple
principle that "consultation" does not require an affirmative response from the official being
consulted, as approval would. Accordingly, it is a less stringent standard for a communication to
meet and, therefore, does not significantly delay the decisionmaking of the state veterinarian.
361. This Comment does not distinguish between the Governor and the Governor's designee.
362. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 1, § 106-399.4(a), 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 14
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to approve the recognition of the threat condition, not the veterinarian's
decision to exercise the powers. Certainly the General Assembly
contemplated the rapid execution of the powers once approval is given, but
from a technical standpoint the approval is essentially the final authorizing
363
step, after which the veterinarian is allowed to operate as she sees fit.
This interpretation is consistent with the remaining language of the
statute. The approval provision is included in the beginning of the statute,
qualifying the determination of the state veterinarian. 3' But once the state
veterinarian has received approval, she "may," for example, under section
106-401, exercise the quarantine power.3 65 Discretion is vested entirely in
the state veterinarian.
This interpretation is also consistent with the approach taken in earlier
parts of section 106. Sections 106.304 through 106.306 lay out the
procedure by which the Governor may prohibit the importation of
66
potentially infected livestock and materials dangerous to livestock.
Section 106.304 and section 106.305 authorize the Governor, upon a
recommendation from the Agriculture Commissioner, to "issue his
proclamation" prohibiting the imports.367 Once the proclamation is issued,
however, the Agriculture Commissioner is empowered to make the rules
and regulations required for containment.3 68 This approach is identical to
that chosen in the 2001 legislation: the Governor first validates the
executive agent's assessment of the situation, then the agent crafts and
implements the containment policy under her own discretion.
B.

North CarolinaStatutes

The distinction between requiring approval and consultation was an
important one for the General Assembly because inherent within the choice
between the two are larger questions regarding the role of the Governor in a
crisis and the balance between efficiency and accountability. The first step
in assessing the decision to require approval rather than consultation is to
examine other North Carolina statutes that expressly require either approval
or consultation. North Carolina statutes rarely mandate consultation with
the Governor. Executive branch officials must consult the Governor in one
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.4(a)).
363. This Comment does not address whether the benefits of vesting sole discretion in the
state veterinarian-such as increased efficiency in the emergency situation-outweigh the costs
of vesting one official with unchecked authority.

364. Id.
365. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, sec. 2, § 106-401(a), 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 14, 15-16
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-401(a)).
366. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106.304 to 106.306 (2003).
367. Id. §§ 106.304, 106.305.
368. Id. § 106.306.
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appointment context

69

and prior to the publication of his official papers. 70

Neither example is comparable to the contagious animal disease legislation.
More important to this Comment, however, are two statutes requiring the
Governor to consult with the GeneralAssembly in times of crisis. The first,
section 113B-22, concerns the response to an energy crisis. 37' The
Governor is not allowed to implement the energy emergency response
programs without first consulting with the prescribed legislative committee
unless the committee fails to act within forty-eight hours after the
submission of the plans.372 Yet, if a majority of the Council of State finds
the crisis to be of such "immediacy as to make delay for legislative review
cause for probable harm to the public," the Governor may act prior to
consultation and before the expiration of the forty-eight-hour period.373 In

a similar manner, the Governor is required to consult the Joint Legislative
Commission on Governmental Operations prior to allocating money from
the Contingency and Emergency Fund.374 However, the statute then
qualifies the requirement:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision or any other
provision of law requiring prior consultation by the Governor with
the Commission, whenever an expenditure is required because of an
emergency that poses an imminent threat to public health or public
safety, and is... [the result of a natural event] ... the Governor may
take action under this subsection without consulting the Commission
if the action75 is determined by the Governor to be related to the
emergency.
Both emergency response statutes, while requiring consultation, actually
vest the emergency response power in the Governor-in one case to act on
his own volition and in the other with a majority of the Council of State.
Statutes requiring the Governor to approve executive action are much
more common.
Express approval is often required for executive
appointments,376 financial agreements signed by the state,377 the hiring of
369. See id. § 108A-29(q) ("The Chairman ... shall appoint the State Job Service Employer
Committee members after consultation with the Governor.").
370. See id. § 121-6(b) (requiring consultation with the Governor when determining how
many copies of the Governor's papers and other official releases shall be printed).
371. Seeid. § 113B-22.
372. Id. § 113B-22(b). Examples of emergency responses are included in the statute. See id.
§ 113B-22(d).
373. Id.
374. Id. § 120-76(8)(a).
375. Id. § 120-76.
376. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-148 (2003) (requiring the Governor's approval before
appointment of bank conservators); id. § 95-3 (mandating the Governor's approval before
appointment of chief administrative officers of the Department of Labor).
377. See, e.g., id. § 74-68 (requiring the Governor's approval before the Department of
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private legal counsel by the state,378 and the exercising of the power of
eminent domain379 or transferring land to a private entity. 380 Approval of
the Governor is required in some emergency situations. 38' The State
Treasurer is only authorized to make emergency, short-term notes with
approval of the Governor and Council of State.382 Only with the approval
of the Governor may the Commissioner of Banks exercise his emergency
power to limit the amount of money that may be withdrawn from bank
accounts.383 Chief executives of political subdivisions are allowed to
negotiate emergency "mutual aid agreements" with other cities and states,
but only with the Governor's approval.384 In the case of an environmental
emergency, the Governor must concur in the decision of the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources before the Secretary
is empowered to order the allegedly polluting entity to reduce or
discontinue the polluting emissions.385 As a component of the state's
response to contagious animal diseases, section 106-308 requires the
approval of the Governor before the Budget Director can transfer funds by
emergency provision to fight or prevent an outbreak of FMD or other
threatening, infectious disease.386
The most notable exception to vesting executive control in an
emergency in the Governor, and a useful parallel to the quarantine power
authorized under section 106-401, is the quarantine power of the state
health director.3 87 In an emergency, the health director does not have to
consult with the Governor before acting.388 The health director has

Natural Resources seeks, accepts, or spends federal grants); id. § 146-17.1(a) (requiring the
Department of Administration to receive the Governor's approval before paying a private party
for information leading to the reclamation of state land); id. § 18B-208(a) (authorizing the ABC
Commission to issue bonds with the Governor's approval).
378. See id. § 62-48(b) ("The [Utilities] Commission may... employ, subject to the approval
of the Governor, private legal counsel .... ").
379. See, e.g., id. § 143-341(4)(d) (authorizing the "power of eminent domain ... subject to
the approval of the Governor .... "); id. § 146-24.1 (providing that all bonds acquired via the
power of eminent domain must have approval of the Governor).
380. See, e.g., id. § 143-341(4)(e) ("Any conveyance of land made ... without the approval
of the governor ... is voidable.").
381. In emergency situations, the executive power is primarily vested in the Governor. See
id. § 166A-5. However, the analysis in this section focuses on emergency situations where
another executive agent is authorized to act but required to seek approval prior to acting.
382. Id. § 147-70.
383. Id. § 54B-125; id. § 54C-87.
384. See id. § 166A-10(c).
385. See id. § 143-215.3(a)(12).
386. See id. § 106-308.
387. See id. § 130A-145(a).
388. See id. § 130A-145 (omitting any requirement comparable to the approval provision in
the contagious animal disease statutes).
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'
"isolation authority" and "quarantine authority."389
"Isolation authority,"
simply put, is the power to isolate an infected individual person or
animal.39 "Quarantine authority" is the power to restrict the movement of
multiple potentially infected persons or animals. 9 1 When the powers are
exercised in response to an animal disease that may be passed to humans,
the health director must consult with the state veterinarian, but neither the
approval of the state veterinarian nor the Governor's approval is required
prior to implementation.392

C. Approval of the Governor.- Case Law
North Carolina courts have addressed similar gubernatorial approval
provisions. In North Carolina State Ports Authority v. Southern Felt
39 3
Corporation,
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that failure to

seek and affirmatively plead prior approval of the Governor prohibited the
state port authority from exercising the power of eminent domain otherwise
granted to it.394 It endorsed Supreme Court of North Carolina decisions
Redevelopment Commission v. Hagins395 and Durham and Northern
Railroad Company v. Richmond and Danville Railroad Company,39 6 which

held that statutes depriving citizens of property should be strictly
construed.397

When included in a statute, especially one authorizing the

power to deprive a citizen of property or liberty, the prior approval of the
Governor must be sought.398

The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Frye Regional Medical
Center v. Hunt399 defined, in part, the nature of the Governor's approval

power. In Frye Regional, plaintiffs challenged the power of the Governor
to amend policies submitted for his approval.'
As was required by law,
the annual State Medical Facilities Plan had been submitted for the
Governor's approval.4"'
Instead of outright approval, the Governor
389. Id. § 130A-145(a).
390. Id. § 130A-2(3a).
391. Id. § 130A-2(7a) (defining "quarantine authority," in part, as restricting the movement of
animals or people that "have been exposed to or are reasonably suspected of having been exposed
to a communicable disease").
392. See id. § 130A-145(c).
393. 1 N.C. App. 231, 161 S.E.2d 47 (1968).
394. Id. at 232-34, 161 S.E.2d at 49-50.
395. 258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391 (1962).
396. 106 N.C. 42, 10 S.E. 1041 (1890).
397. See Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 224-25, 128 S.E.2d 391, 394
(quoting Durham & N. R.R. Co. v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 106 N.C. 42, 48-49, 10 S.E.
1041, 1042-43 (1890)).
398. N.C. State Ports Auth. v. S. Felt Corp., 1 N.C. App. 231, 233, 161 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1968).
399. 350 N.C. 39, 510 S.E.2d 159(1999).
400. Id. at 40,510 S.E.2d at 160.
401. Id. at40,510S.E.2dat161.
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amended the plan prior to approving it.4 °2 Plaintiff challenged the legality
of the Governor's action. The court found that the power to approve a state
policy included the power to amend that policy prior to approval4" 3 and that
the approval authority was not identical to the veto (i.e., an "up or down"
vote) authority.4" Frye Regional, like Southern Felt, recognizes the critical
role of gubernatorial approval.
D. Approval of the Governor: Policy Analysis
From a policy standpoint, the question is should the General Assembly
require the state veterinarian receive the Governor's approval of the threat
assessment prior to implementing the state's contagious animal disease
policy, as opposed to, can, from a legal standpoint, the General Assembly
impose this restriction. In addressing the policy question, the issues
surrounding the requirement should first be highlighted. Response speed is
an important factor. Given the contagious nature of the diseases, the state
policy should aim to contain a potentially infected animal as fast as
possible. The slower the response to an infected animal, the more likely an
4
outbreak is to occur.

05

In addition, the state policy should emphasize accuracy. The three
controversial powers detailed above, regardless of justification, are extreme
invasions on the rights of individuals. Exercising those powers without
cause should be avoided. The "trigger provision" is the only section in the
statute that slows, and can possibly prevent, the implementation of the
response plan. Accordingly, it can be used to confirm the existence of the
threat before implementation.
The state policy should also maximize accountability. With the
potential for a great exercise of police power, citizens should be able to
hold the government accountable. Moreover, the General Assembly and
executive officials can use North Carolina citizens' political response as a
means to judge the appropriateness of the animal disease response, should
the policy ever need to be implemented again or an election occur while the
powers are being exercised.40 6
E.

Conclusion
The General Assembly justifiably required the state veterinarian to

402. Id.
403. Id. at 47, 510 S.E.2d at 164.
404. Frye Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 43, 510 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1999).
405. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the contagious nature of
FMD).
406. Depending on the difficulty associated with identifying and containing a disease, there is
no upper limit on the duration of an eradication program.
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receive the Governor's approval rather than simply consult with the
Governor when determining if the threat level is sufficient to "trigger" the
executive response articulated in S.B. 779. The decision to require
approval is consistent with other North Carolina statutes. 40 7 North Carolina
looks to its Governor in times of crisis and places the responsibility for
crisis management in the Executive's hands.4 8 In particular, approval of
the Governor is already required to financially respond to an FMD crisis.0 9
Requiring approval in the contagious animal disease context is consistent
with this established approach.
The little existing case law regarding the approval power also supports
this decision. Both Frye and Southern Felt highlight the importance of the
approval power-viewing it as a role in the policy-making process, not
simply an unimportant formality.410
As noted earlier, the state health director does not have to receive
approval before exercising quarantine authority when a contagious animal
" '
disease could potentially be passed to humans.41
Requiring the state
veterinarian to seek approval simply notes the difference between the two
crises: a health crisis poses a direct threat to human health, whereas, a
contagious animal disease poses, primarily, an economic threat.412 The
choice to require approval in one situation and not the other is a policy
decision.41 3
The policy analysis concerns three criteria: the speed of the response,
the accuracy of the determination, and the accountability of the government
officials.
Even in the age where technology makes nearly-instant
communication with anyone possible, requiring gubernatorial approval
407. But see supra notes 387-92, infra notes 411-13 and accompanying text (noting the state
health director does not have to receive approval in comparable situations).
408. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-5 (2003) (vesting emergency powers in Governor).
409. Id. § 106-308.
410. See Frye Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 43, 510 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1999) (noting
that the approval power is not simply an "up or down" vote, but rather includes the power to
amend the policy); N.C. State Ports Auth. v. S. Felt Corp., I N.C. App. 231, 233, 161 S.E.2d 47,
49 (1968) (confirming the importance of the approval power).
411. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-145(c) (2003).
412. While rare, MCD can be passed to humans. See WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 36.
The power to quarantine animals infected with an agent that has the potential to be passed to
humans was granted to the state health director in 2002. Act of Oct. 3, 2002, ch. 179, sec. 1,
§ 130A-475, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 803, 803-05 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-475) (creating new powers for health director to respond to terrorist threats). Therefore,
the statute empowers the health director to quarantine a case of MCD without receiving the
Governor's approval. Whether the General Assembly contemplated the exercise of this power in
response to MCD, whether the General Assembly intended to create dissimilar procedures for the
state health director and veterinarian to follow in response to MCD, and whether different
procedures have a legal justification or policy rationale are beyond the scope of this Comment.
413. This Comment does not address whether the differentiation is appropriate. See supra
note 412.
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could slightly diminish the speed of the response. At the very least,
contacting the Governor or his designee is one more conversation the state
veterinarian must have before, for example, implementing the quarantine.
However, the Governor's ability to designate an official to respond on
behalf of the Governor greatly reduces the potential that the approval
requirement could significantly delay implementation. Nothing in the
legislation prevents the Governor from designating someone in the
Department of Agriculture who, presumably, could be easily contacted by
the state veterinarian.41 4
Requiring approval improves the accuracy of the determination. The
Governor or his designee serves as an additional perspective on the
situation-either confirming or challenging the opinion of the state
veterinarian. Further, the act of justifying the determination in order to
receive approval will force the state veterinarian to actually articulate the
rationale and evidence supporting the choice. Both additional elements
will decrease the chances that an incorrect determination is made.
Finally, requiring approval increases accountability. The police
powers associated with a strong disease containment policy are
exceptional. Making an elected official, in part, responsible for the
determination will likely add other factors to the calculation. The
Governor will likely consider individual liberty and broader principles such
as the proper role and power of government, as opposed to basing the
decision solely on whether the policy would contain the disease.
Moreover, the people of North Carolina will be able to directly respond to
the exercise of power through the gubernatorial election instead of having
to attempt to indirectly regulate the appointed state veterinarian.
The state veterinarian is authorized to exercise great police power
once the Governor approves her threat determination. Given that the threat
from MCD or FMD is primarily economic and not related to human health,
the difference between the veterinarian's power and health director's
power-one is required to receive approval, the other is not-is justified.
The approval provision slows the executive branch's reaction to the
disease, but only slightly. It increases both the accountability associated
with the process and its accuracy. The economic threat posed by a
contagious animal disease, like a human health crisis, is great and requires
a rapid response. Nevertheless, the legislative decision to require approval,
rather than just consultation, strikes the appropriate balance between each
factor.

414. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, 2001 Sess. Laws 14 (codified in scattered sections of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106).
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VII. THE SUNSET PROVISION

The expiration date of the powers authorized in the 2001 legislation
was April 2003. The day before it was set to expire, the authorization was
extended until October 2005.415 The sunset provision weakened the 2001
legislation by adding an artificial endpoint to the protection created in S.B.
779, when the threat posed by MCD and FMD has no foreseeable endpoint.
In addition, any informal plan to reauthorize the legislation every two years
runs unnecessary risks.
A.

Two-Year Sunset Provision

The simple purpose of the sunset provision is to mandate the
expiration of the authorized powers on a certain date. In the case of the
powers to contain contagious animal diseases granted in S.B. 779, the
expiration date was roughly two years after the act became law.416 The
sunset provision was added to and removed from both versions of the bill
numerous times.4 17 The justification for the sunset provision is only
mentioned once in the bill's legislative history.418 There was concern that
the legislation might not pass in the House without the sunset provision. 9
This concern demonstrates the two motivations for supporting the
provision. First, a sunset sets a firm limit on the power of the government.
For those legislators concerned that S.B. 779 authorized too much police
power, the sunset provision guaranteed that, at least temporally, the power
was finite. This guarantee made the bill much more palpable. 420 The
second motivation is the political result of the first: legislators may have
supported the sunset provision because without it, the bill may not have
passed in any form-a conclusion presumably unacceptable to most
members.
Regardless of its political value, the sunset provision weakens the
protections offered by S.B. 779.
The powers granted to the state
veterinarian in 2001 were appropriate given the threat posed by contagious
animal diseases, namely economic and health disasters caused by FMD and
MCD outbreaks. 42' These diseases continue to pose a significant threat
because they appear without warning, especially in the case of MCD,

415. Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 6, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 3.
416. Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch. 12, § 11, 2001 Sess. Laws 14, 21.
417. See supra Part ll.A (discussing legislative history).
418. Control Foot & Mouth/Animal Disease Outbreaks: Hearing on S.B. 779 Before the
House Agriculture Committee, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2001) (Apr. 4, 2001 minutes).
419. Id.
420. See id. (noting the opinion of some legislators at the time that the House may not pass
the bill without a sunset provision).
421. See supra Part I.C-E.
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which is particularly difficult to diagnose,422 and spread rapidly.423 The
appearance of MCD in the United States in 2003 surprised the agriculture
industry.4 24 An FMD case discovered in North Carolina would certainly
deliver a comparable surprise. A case is just as likely to be discovered, and
a strong executive response just as needed, after the expiration date on any
legislation as prior to the expiration date. An arbitrary expiration date, as
long as the threat continues, weakens the protection established in S.B. 779
by capping it. Having no rational relationship to the FMD or MCD threat,
the expiration date simply notes the day on which North Carolina will leave
its agriculture industry to face the threat without being able to count on the
strong governmental response authorized by S.B. 779.
In addition, the triggering provision discussed earlier 425 provides a
sufficient check on the police power vested in the veterinarian. The new
powers are only operative under specific conditions and only with the
approval of the Governor, an official directly accountable to the people for
his decision. The political check on the Governor functions as a check on
the arbitrary exercise of the police powers, but leaves the powers available
to meet an emergency. A sunset provision, even if intended to limit the
police power of government, represents a decision to leave North
Carolina's agriculture industry potentially unguarded in the face of a still
viable threat.
B.

Informal ReauthorizationPlan

The state veterinarian's powers were reauthorized the day before they
expired, March 31, 2003.426 Again leaving aside the political element, the
reauthorization signals one of two intentions. On one hand, the General
Assembly and Governor contemplate an informal system under which this
issue is revisited and reapproved every two years. This approach has
almost the same practical consequences as removing the sunset provision:
there would be no gap in the veterinarian's authority unless the General
Assembly or Governor fails to reapprove the measures. If the General
Assembly and the Governor intend to perpetually extend the sunset to
provide constant authorization, the better policy approach would be the
removal of the sunset provision, which would require legislative action
(revoking the power) instead of simple non-action (not considering a bill to
extend the sunset) to discontinue the veterinarian's authority. As the threat
posed by MCD, FMD, and other contagious animal diseases falls from the
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

N.C. CHART, supra note 18.
Id.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See Part VI.
Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 6, § 2, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 4.
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limelight and the focus of the agriculture industry turns to a new issue,
elected leaders will be more likely to rank the reauthorization of the 2001
power behind other priorities. Eliminating the sunset provision-and by
doing so requiring action rather than inaction to change the policy-makes
leaving the powers of S.B. 779 in place the default position and leaves the
agriculture industry protected even if reauthorization of the state
veterinarian's authority fails to remain high on the legislative priority list.
On the other hand, the intention of the General Assembly and the
Governor could be to revisit and reconsider the issue every two years,
which leaves only two possible results. The General Assembly or
Governor (through the veto power) could fail to extend the sunset
provision, and thereby increase the vulnerability of the state's agriculture
industry. Or, the sunset provision could be extended. The extension of the
sunset functions the same in the short-term as the removal of the sunset
provision. There is no long-term since the same issue is raised again in two
years.
The counterargument to this position emphasizes the existence of
choice-the General Assembly and the Governor, and through them the
people, every two years may reassess the situation and "choose" to
reauthorize the state veterinarian. The choice, however, is really a
Hobson's choice: one of the two options leaves the state economy
unacceptably open to an MCD or FMD outbreak. The sunset provision, by
forcing this choice and creating the potential that North Carolina could be
left unprepared to protect its agriculture industry, decreases the protection
crafted in S.B. 779. Consequently, the sunset provision should be
removed.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER CONSIDERATION

This Comment has noted a few distinct aspects of the contagious
animal disease legislation that deserve further legislative consideration.
Primarily, the sunset provision should be removed. The constant threat to
the state's livestock requires a state veterinarian continuously empowered
to contain an outbreak. In addition, the General Assembly should articulate
a clear definition of "quarantine," specifically, whether the state
veterinarian has the power to control the movement of people as well as
animals. The "triggering" provision should also be revisited. The language
currently requires the Governor to approve the determination of the threat
made by the state veterinarian.4 27 It is not clear whether the General
Assembly's intention was that the Governor would be required to approve
the exercise of the powers. Finally, the relationship between the state
427. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-399.5 (2003) (requiring approval of determination).
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health director's quarantine power and the state veterinarian's quarantine
power should be reconsidered. In particular, the state health director is
authorized to quarantine animals without the Governor's approval if the
animal disease threatens human health. 2 In the case of MCD, this would
allow the state health director to quarantine the animal without approval,
but the state veterinarian would have to wait for approval.
CONCLUSION

The first American cow infected with MCD and a recent American
death attributed to MCD have again brought the issue of contagious animal
diseases to the forefront of public debate. Because of the state's large
cattle and pork industries, protecting livestock from a contagious animal
disease is a critical public policy issue facing North Carolina. The current
containment policy, enacted in 2001 in response to the FMD outbreak in
the United Kingdom and fear of a similar outbreak in North Carolina,
authorizes the state veterinarian to quarantine large areas of the state,
conduct warrantless searches and seizures, and destroy potentially infected
animals without notice. Each power, while broader than those formerly
vested in the veterinarian, is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and with
other North Carolina statutes. Before the veterinarian may exercise these
powers, however, the Governor must approve the veterinarian's
determination that an "imminent threat" exists. This check on the power
granted to the veterinarian further protects individual rights and is an
appropriate addition to the statute. The powers also have a sunset
provision. The current expiration date is October 2005.429 The sunset
provision is an unnecessary aspect of the statute. As demonstrated by the
2003 MCD discovery, livestock are not, and presumably will not be in the
foreseeable future, absolutely safe from contagious animal diseases.
Accordingly, it is currently impossible to revoke the powers granted by
S.B. 779 without vesting the power in another official or compromising
safety. The North Carolina General Assembly authorized the state
veterinarian to exercise extraordinary police power. Yet, because an
outbreak of FMD, MCD, or another contagious animal disease could
deliver a catastrophic blow to the livestock industry in North Carolina and
North Carolina's economy as a whole, S.B. 779 is defensible.
ANDREW

428. Id. § 130A-145(c).
429. Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 6, § 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3.
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